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1Introduction
This report aims to contribute to the development of a best practice guide for public authorities on monitoring and
enforcing rules and regulations relevant to labour market intermediaries to prevent trafficking for labour exploitation.
The report brings together research findings on two main areas: how labour market intermediaries are regulated by public
authorities in the different Member States, and to what extent social partners’ activities contribute to preventing
trafficking for the purpose of labour exploitation. The main focus of the report is on trafficking for the purpose of labour
exploitation and does not cover trafficking for sexual exploitation. The report is based on information provided by
Eurofound’s network of European correspondents across all 28 EU Member States and Norway.  
Policy context
Since the late 1990s, the drive to prevent trafficking in human beings has been high on the EU agenda. The adoption of
the Palermo Protocol in 2002 to prevent trafficking underpinned the adoption of the EU Council Framework Decision
and an EU plan to address trafficking in the same year. In 2011, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a
Directive on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims. Taking its lead from the
Anti-Trafficking Directive, the EU Strategy towards the eradication of trafficking in human beings 2012–2016 (COM
(2012) 286 final) includes a set of targeted actions aimed at prevention, protection, prosecution and partnerships. The
strategy also identifies recruitment as an area relevant to trafficking and highlights the importance of including trade
unions and employer organisations when developing anti-trafficking policies. 
Key findings
The report analyses legislation, regulation and social partner activities to counter the potential involvement of labour
market intermediaries in trafficking for labour exploitation. The first part of the report discusses the policy context and
definitions while considering potential ways in which labour market intermediaries could be linked to trafficking. Labour
market intermediaries are private or public entities or institutions mediating between the individual seeking employment
and the employer, operating either as Employment Placement Agencies (EPAs) or Temporary Work Agencies (TWAs). 
The research shows that there was a rapid escalation in the number of labour market intermediaries towards the end of
the 20th century after many EU countries lifted restrictions and began to regulate temporary agency work. 
The relevant European and international regulations include the Temporary Agency Work Directive (2008/104/EC) and
ILO Convention 181 which govern employment agencies, as well as different national measures to regulate and monitor
labour market intermediaries. The most common forms of regulating labour market intermediaries in the EU include
licensing, registration or certification schemes. 
The research identified four sectors that across most countries were linked to problems with trafficking for labour
exploitation: agriculture, construction, domestic work, and hotels and restaurants. In some countries, problematic sectors
include retail (Belgium and Sweden), beauty and hair salons (Finland), transport (Romania) and waste and recycling
(Denmark).  
Social partners provide information and experience regarding fraudulent recruitment and labour exploitation. Sharing
information, mutual support and effective cooperation are key to preventing and eradicating trafficking for labour
exploitation. At international level, the social partners for the temporary agency sector (Uni Global and CIETT)
concluded a Memorandum of Understanding on temporary agency work in 2008 in which both sides pledge their support
for a regulatory framework to prohibit agency work from undercutting other workers’ rights and conditions. The research
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2finds that national social partners are increasingly recognising their responsibility in this area and voicing their concern
about fraudulent recruitment and exploitative labour practices. However, despite this activity, it seems that trafficking
for labour exploitation is still not a priority at national level. 
Social partners across the Member States and Norway have developed various practices to combat trafficking for labour
exploitation by labour market intermediaries. These complement state policies and can take a variety of forms, such as:
collective agreements, joint initiatives, dialogue with the government, campaigns, systems for handling complaints,
trans-national cooperation, developing codes of conduct, providing information and educational material, increased
inspections, and the use of media. 
The report reveals that social partner involvement in this area is often challenging. As employer associations do not cover
all labour market intermediaries, enforcement, especially in the case of small- or medium-sized intermediaries, can be
problematic. Trade unions are not always in a position to reach all workers, particularly those in ‘hidden’ or isolated
employment.
Policy pointers
Examples of emerging good practice are highlighted throughout the report. National government activities include cross-
border cooperation, labour inspectorate activity, introducing legislation and regulation, supporting cooperation between
different authorities, providing guidance through awareness-raising, training and ethical codes, giving support to victims
and cooperating with social partners. Many emerging good practice examples from governments, as well as those from
social partners, involve targeting victims and attempting to raise awareness about trafficking for labour exploitation. As
little was identified which specifically referred to labour market intermediaries, or indeed employers, the report
emphasises that more could be done to address the issue by both employers’ associations and trade unions. In countries
with a functioning sectoral social dialogue, it could be practical for the social partners to develop a joint strategy to tackle
unfair competition and downward pressure on pay and conditions. 
The following points should be considered when developing a best practice guide for public authorities on better
monitoring and enforcing rules and regulations to prevent trafficking for labour exploitation by labour market
intermediaries:
n Develop clear national definitions of labour market intermediaries, trafficking and labour exploitation based on
relevant European Directives, and international instruments.
n Use concise definitions to improve the collection of data on the significance and incidence of labour market
intermediaries and trafficking for labour exploitation.
n Increase the coverage of labour market intermediaries who are registered, licensed and/or certified. 
n Make use of improved registration, licensing and/or certification to help comprehensively enforce and sanction
labour market intermediaries which might be engaged at the entry point of trafficking.
n Increase regional and cross-border cooperation among public authorities and the social partners. 
n Support coherent and effective bipartite and tripartite joint activities dealing with labour market intermediaries and
recruitment practices, and trafficking for labour exploitation.
n Support the social partners in increasing collective representation particularly in small- and medium-sized labour
market intermediaries.
Regulation of labour market intermediaries and the role of social partners in preventing trafficking of labour 
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3Background and policy context 
The right to free movement for workers within the European Economic Community (EEC), as provided for in Article 48
of the EEC Treaty in 1957 (now Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), radically altered
the context for finding work and moving for it within what is now the European Union. The provision governing the free
movement of workers is laid down in Directive 2004/38/EC which defines the rights of EU citizens to move and reside
freely within Member States. The Directive re-affirms that: 
the free movement of persons constitutes one of the fundamental freedoms of the internal market, which comprises
an area without internal frontiers, in which freedom is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.
Labour mobility within the European internal market is a fundamental freedom, aimed at promoting employment growth
and economic performance. Private labour market intermediaries – such as temporary work agencies (TWAs) and
employment placement agencies (EPAs) – play a role in facilitating the free movement of workers within the EU. Labour
market intermediaries mediate between individual workers and the organisation that needs to get the work done. They
may lease workers to companies or act as brokers to fill jobs. Previous research by Eurofound on Temporary agency
work in an enlarged EU and on Temporary agency work and collective bargaining indicates that temporary agency work
is one of the fastest growing types of employment in many EU Member States (Eurofound, 2006 and 2009). 
If the facilitation of labour through labour market intermediaries is not adequately regulated, workers run the risk of
being exploited by fraudulent labour market intermediaries. During the recruitment process, the potential employee
might be deceived about the nature of the job, location or employer. The potential employee’s vulnerability might also
be exploited. International and European reports have increasingly shown how abuse by labour market intermediaries
can result in employers disproportionately benefiting from people’s labour, which might amount to trafficking in human
beings for the purpose of labour exploitation (Fudge and Strauss, 2014).
Regulating and monitoring the compliance of labour market intermediaries with standards to protect the employee, as
well as the business sector, is a recent phenomenon. At EU level, the Temporary Agency Work Directive 2008/104/EC
(TAW Directive) was adopted to ensure ‘the protection of temporary agency workers and to improve the quality of
temporary agency work’. The temporary agency sector is recognised as a legitimate and professional business.
Prohibitions or restrictions on the use of temporary agency work are justified only on grounds of general interest relating,
in particular, to the protection of the workers, the requirements of health and safety at work, the need to ensure the
smooth functioning of the labour market and to prevent abuse. In addition, the TAW Directive ensures that temporary
agency workers – once employed – are treated as equal to employees in other types of employment. The TAW Directive
establishes that a temporary work agency may be a natural or legal person. The Anti-Trafficking Directive
(2011/36/EU) aims to protect potential employees from coercive, fraudulent or deceptive recruitment for the purpose of
exploitation. It further establishes that legal persons can be held liable for trafficking in human beings and that this can
include criminal prosecution.
Introduction
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4Since the late 1990s, the fight against trafficking in human beings has been high on the EU policy agenda. The adoption
of the Palermo Protocol in 2000 to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in people, especially women and children,
supplemented the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, and supported the adoption of the
EU Council Framework Decision (2002/629/JHA) and an EU plan to address trafficking in the same year. In 2011, the
European Parliament and the Council adopted the Anti-Trafficking Directive, thereby replacing the 2002 Council
Framework Decision. Trafficking in human beings is defined in Article 2 as: 
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or reception of persons, including the exchange or transfer of
control over those persons, by means of threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits
to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.
The Anti-Trafficking Directive recognises human trafficking as a crime and a violation of human rights and aims to
prevent human trafficking and strengthen protection for victims. The Directive puts a special emphasis on the victims of
trafficking by applying a rights-based approach and places particular emphasis on child victims. It also recognises that
women and men are often trafficked for different purposes and therefore victim support needs to be gender-specific. It
is relevant to the study of labour market intermediaries as trafficking can start with recruitment. Member States must
adopt measures that hold labour market intermediaries – either a legal or natural person – liable for any offences
specified in Article 2 of the Anti-Trafficking Directive, such as deceptive recruitment for the purpose of exploiting a
person’s labour. 
The scope of the Anti-Trafficking Directive is inclusive, as it condemns trafficking for the purpose of any form of
exploitation. The Directive establishes a minimum number of exploitation types – although this list is non-exhaustive
(more forms can be included by the Member States) – and specifies the minimum forms of exploitation:
Exploitation shall include, as a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labour or services, including begging, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude, or the
exploitation of criminal activities, or the removal of organs.
Trafficking in human beings is explicitly prohibited by Article 5 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union (2000) which recognises that any form of trafficking is a serious violation of human rights and that
legal persons (such as labour market intermediaries) can be held accountable for trafficking in human beings. When the
Treaty of Lisbon came into force in 2009, the Charter became primary EU law according to Article 6 (1) of the Treaty
of the European Union (TEU). The Anti-Trafficking Directive underlines this by highlighting that: 
this Directive respects fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union and notably human dignity, the prohibition of slavery, forced labour and
trafficking in human beings, the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the rights
of the child, the right to liberty and security, freedom of expression and information, the protection of personal data,
the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial and the principles of the legality and proportionality of criminal
offences and penalties. In particular, this Directive seeks to ensure full respect for those rights and principles and
must be implemented accordingly.
Following on from the Anti-Trafficking Directive, the EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human
Beings 2012–2016 (COM (2012) 286 final) (the Anti-Trafficking Strategy), further elaborates on areas covered by the
Directive and includes a set of targeted actions. It focuses on prevention, protection, prosecution and partnerships and
also on ways to increase knowledge regarding emerging concerns related to trafficking in human beings. 
Regulation of labour market intermediaries and the role of social partners in preventing trafficking of labour 
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5Regulation of labour market intermediaries and the role of social partners in preventing trafficking of labour 
The strategy identifies recruitment as an area relevant to trafficking and highlights the necessity of adopting coherent
policies requiring the contribution of a diverse group of actors including trade unions and employer organisations. In
order to contribute to ‘increased knowledge of, and effective response to, emerging concerns related to all forms of
trafficking in human beings’, the strategy envisages that the European Commission together with Eurofound will
develop a best practice guide for public authorities on the monitoring and enforcement of labour market intermediaries
to prevent trafficking in human beings for the purpose of labour exploitation (Priority E: Action 4). The findings of this
present report will be used as background material for the development of the best practice guide. Other complementary
deliverables mentioned in the strategy are the recently published report on case law related to trafficking in human
beings for labour exploitation and the forthcoming establishment of a European Business Coalition. 
Although the Anti-Trafficking Directive focuses on forms of forced labour or services, it is important to note that there
are different forms of abuse or exploitation in the labour market. However, only those forms that are relevant to
trafficking in human beings are covered in the present report. 
The link between the recruitment of employees by rogue labour market intermediaries and the potential mistreatment of
workers, including trafficking in human beings, is established by EU law. However, research has recently started to
concentrate more intensely on labour supply chains and potential abuses such as trafficking people along the supply
chain. For instance, a recent working paper published by the International Labour Organization (ILO) on global labour
recruitment sets out to explain why the recruitment market operates the way it does and suggests responses by
governments and social partners to address some of the recruitment market’s shortcomings (Gordon, 2015). Acting as
the guardian of the Palermo Protocol, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) actively assists Member
States to tackle trafficking. A recent report from UNODC examines the relationship between the fraudulent
recruitment practices of agencies and trafficking (938KB PDF), highlighting the criminal justice measures that can
be taken to address this (UNODC, 2015b). In line with the UNODC report, a UN Working Group on Trafficking in
Persons meeting in Vienna on 16–18 November 2015 recommends that: 
States’ parties should consider taking measures to regulate, register, license and monitor private recruitment and
employment agencies (…) to ensure that such agencies are not used to facilitate trafficking in persons.
(CTOC/COP/WG.4/2015/2)
Some concrete cases are mentioned in a 2015 report by the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), which highlights
the risks that workers face if they are dependent on agencies (1.7MB PDF) for visas, transportation, accommodation
and information about the work involved. Examples include the fraudulent charging of fees, lack of transparency and
absence of written contracts. In some cases, it is not even clear who is responsible for the exploitative practices because
the work has been subcontracted multiple times.
Objectives and scope of the report
The main purpose of this report, is to provide information that will be used to prepare a guide for public authorities on
the best practices in monitoring and enforcing rules and regulations relevant to labour market intermediaries to prevent
trafficking for labour exploitation. As such, the report constitutes Eurofound’s analysis of the current regulations related
to labour market intermediaries in Member States, includes trade unions’ and employer organisations’ initiatives
contributing to the prevention of trafficking in human beings, and presents proposals on how to improve the public
monitoring and enforcement of labour market intermediaries. 
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6Information about the regulation of labour market intermediaries in the Member States, together with information on
how social partners approach the issue of trafficking for labour exploitation, is useful to identify what is done well and
what needs to be improved or supported more strongly by public authorities. 
In order to contribute to this objective, the report first looks at how public authorities are currently regulating labour
market intermediaries in Member States, using various means such as registration or licensing schemes. Their
effectiveness is discussed where information has been available.
The report also looks at social partners’ activities to prevent the trafficking of labour. Eurofound is a tripartite agency
with expertise in the area of social partner activities and cooperation. It is therefore well placed to carry out research and
document different activities which are initiated by the social partners, such as awareness-raising campaigns,
establishing complaint mechanisms, developing codes of conduct, distributing educational material and engaging in
cross-border cooperation. Any potential gaps are identified and discussed.  
The report will answer the following questions:
n How are labour market intermediaries regulated across the Member States?
n What are the procedures for establishing labour market intermediaries, especially in terms of registration obligations
and licensing systems?
n What role have TWAs and their national bodies played in fighting the trafficking of labour?
n Have trade unions initiated activities related to preventing and tackling the trafficking of labour?
It should be stated at the outset that trafficking for sexual exploitation is not included in this report. Nor is the report a
comprehensive study of anti-trafficking measures or of labour market intermediaries. Anti-trafficking measures are
covered in various national and international reports, one example being the reports produced by the Council of Europe’s
Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA, 2013 and 2014). The regulation of labour
market intermediaries has been described in reports published by wmp consult (Voss et al, 2013) and by IDEA Consult
(IDEA, 2015), for example. The 2013 Voss study primarily examines the role and dynamics of temporary agency work,
exploring the regulatory frameworks and the industrial relations and employment conditions contexts of this type of
work in the EU as a whole. It is complemented by case studies on major forms of labour market transitions. The IDEA
Consult study (2015) compares temporary agency work with other forms of work, such as open-ended contracts, fixed-
term contracts (FTCs) and self-employment in order to understand better the evolution of the different forms of work,
the working conditions they provide and their contribution in the labour market. 
Structure of the report
This report examines how effective legislation, regulation or social partner activity may be in tackling the potential
involvement of labour market intermediaries in trafficking for labour exploitation. 
The report begins with a discussion of the context, providing definitions and considering what evidence there is to
demonstrate a potential link between labour market intermediaries and trafficking. 
Regulation of labour market intermediaries and the role of social partners in preventing trafficking of labour 
© European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2016
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It goes on to explain the significance and growth of labour market intermediaries in the European labour market and
whether – and how – these intermediaries are subject to regulation at European and international level as well as at
national level. After charting the legal framework, the section discusses trafficking in human beings for labour
exploitation, showing briefly how it is related to, and sometimes also differs from, other phenomena such as forced
labour and other forms of abuse or exploitation. Based on the questionnaire responses from national experts in the EU
Member States and Norway, and other national and transnational reports and studies, the relationship between the two
phenomena (labour market intermediaries and trafficking) is demonstrated.
The next section focuses on the relationship between labour market intermediaries and trafficking, and the potential roles
of the social partners in combating trafficking related to, or involving, labour market intermediaries.
Finally, examples of good practice are presented. These have been developed through the research and described in
conjunction with other findings taken from literature on the subject. Together with the report’s recommendations, these
examples will contribute to the compilation of a guide for public authorities to understand better the concept and practice
of trafficking for labour exploitation. Furthermore, and most importantly, the report presents suggestions on what tools
and measures can help to monitor labour market intermediaries better and to enforce LMI regulation aimed at tackling
and preventing trafficking for labour exploitation.
Understanding the issue
The report deals with two distinct, yet intertwined, areas of the labour market. On one hand, it has to do with labour
market intermediaries and their recruitment of workers. On the other hand, it looks at trafficking for the purpose of
labour exploitation. Trafficking is defined in terms of three characteristics: what is done (action), how is it done (means)
and why is it done (purpose). This definition brings together the two areas relevant to this report: Trafficking through
recruitment of potential workers (action) who were deceived about their potential job, location or employer (means) in
order to exploit their labour (purpose).
The actors – public authorities and social partners – who set out to prevent, monitor and fight exploitative practices by
labour market intermediaries and trafficking in human beings are relevant to both areas of interest. These actors either
have a legal obligation or the required expertise to tackle the issue. Figure 1 and the examples below are intended to
illustrate and clarify the variety of combinations between employment within the EU labour market, recruitment or
employment by an LMI and the experience of being trafficked for labour exploitation. It should be noted that the figure
is a very simplified way of categorising the different scenarios, as it aims to provide an overview. More detailed
information and an individual assessment would be needed for each case to categorise it thoroughly.
© European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2016
8Figure 1: The variety of combinations between employment, recruitment and trafficking for labour exploitation
n Example A: German citizen recruited by a family in Germany to work as a caregiver for their aged relative – 1 would
apply. 
n Example B: Worker from Moldova recruited by an agent registered in Dublin to work for a Russian contractor on a
construction site in Moscow – 6 would apply.
n Example C: British bitumen worker taken by UK-based employer to work in Belgium for no pay, without an
opportunity to refuse work – 5 would apply.
n Example D: Seafarer recruited by a Philippines-based agency to work on a Bahamas-registered ship with a Chinese
owner. No wages paid, seafarer prevented by immigration rules from leaving ship – 4 would apply, until ship docks
in EU port, at which point 7 would apply.
n Example E: Bangladeshi worker recruited by a local agent to work in Dubai – 3 applies unless, for example, their
travel documents and pay are withheld, in which case 4 would apply.
n Example F: Thai workers recruited by Thai agents to pick berries in Sweden. Poor living conditions and wages
unpaid for the purpose of exploitation – 7 would apply.
n Example G: Polish workers recruited by a Netherlands-based temporary work agent to work picking asparagus in
Germany. Underpaid wages, collective agreement not applied – 6 would apply, but 2 could equally apply depending
on the judgement of local courts regarding the nature of the exploitation.
n Example H: Filipino worker applies via online recruitment site for a job as a domestic worker in the Czech Republic
– 6 would apply.
The examples show that different forms of abuse are prevalent in the labour market. This report focuses only on
situations where the trafficking in human beings is involved. The focus concerning trafficking in human beings is based
on deceptive recruitment by labour market intermediaries. The Anti-Trafficking Directive defines trafficking for labour
exploitation as a criminal act. The European Commission recognises that the fight against trafficking needs to be as
inclusive as possible to eradicate any related type of exploitation. 
Regulation of labour market intermediaries and the role of social partners in preventing trafficking of labour 
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The terms used in this report are defined in the following section.
Definition of key terms
Labour market intermediaries are ‘entities or institutions that interpose themselves between workers and firms to
facilitate, inform, or regulate how workers are matched to firms, how work is accomplished, and how conflicts are
resolved’ (Autor, 2009). These entities can be private or public. 
Public employment services (PES) are agencies run by public authorities who place, counsel, and provide vocational
guidance and similar services in connection with job search and placement to jobseekers. 
Temporary work agencies (TWAs) are defined by the Temporary Agency Work (TAW) Directive to designate ‘any
natural or legal person who, in compliance with national law, concludes contracts of employment or employment
relationships with temporary agency workers in order to assign them to user undertakings to work there temporarily
under their supervision and direction.’
Registration systems require businesses to register with a public authority before starting to operate their business. They
often serve as a registry of the amount and kind of businesses which are providing goods and services.
Licensing system refers to a mandatory (sometimes voluntary) certificate or authorisation from a public or private
authority. Licences to operate a business such as a LMI are often monitored. Licensing standards, which can cover health
and safety, accommodation, pay, transport and training, as well as complying with national tax regimes, are checked
through inspections. Licences might need renewal on a regular basis or become indefinite after a business operates for
a number of years. 
Trafficking in human beings is defined by the Anti-Trafficking Directive. It means ‘the recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harbouring or reception of persons, including the exchange or transfer of control over those persons, by means
of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of
a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.’ Accordingly, to categorise an activity as trafficking for
labour exploitation (or trafficking of labour) three conditions need to be fulfilled: An action, a means and a purpose. In
the context of this report, the focus lies on deceptive and coercive recruitment to exploit someone’s labour. A list of
operational indicators to measure and detect trafficking for labour exploitation (7.2MB PDF) was developed by a
joint project of the European Commission and the International Labour Organization (ILO).
Breaches of labour rights refer to the lack of respect for a person’s rights at work as enshrined in international,
European and national law. Labour rights include a wide range of individual and collective rights related to working
conditions (including working time, pay, and holidays) or workers’ right to participation (including information and
consultation). Breaches of labour rights are not necessarily linked to trafficking. The condition of identifying a purpose
(such as exploitation of labour in severe cases) might be fulfilled by disrespecting labour rights. Yet the required action
and means are missing for this situation to be defined as trafficking for labour exploitation. 
Labour exploitation in this context is a collective reference to the purposes of trafficking in human beings in relation
to exploitative work. At a minimum, the Anti-Trafficking Directive states that labour exploitation includes forced labour
or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, and servitude. The term labour exploitation is more inclusive than
forced labour or slavery, as it encompasses a variety of possible abusive situations related to work. 
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Forced labour is defined by the ILO Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29). It means ‘all work or service which
is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself
voluntarily’. The Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention reaffirms this definition and establishes the link
between trafficking and forced labour by highlighting that ‘specific action against trafficking in persons for the purpose
of forced or compulsory labour’ needs to be taken.
Figure 2 shows that of the many forms of breaches of labour rights in the labour market, some can be considered as
labour exploitation. Once people are recruited, by fraudulent or deceptive means for the purpose of exploiting their
labour, the act may then be classified as trafficking for the purpose of labour exploitation. In certain cases, trafficking
for labour exploitation can amount to trafficking for the purpose of forced labour. It should be noted here that both labour
exploitation and forced labour could take place in conjunction with trafficking, but also without it.
Figure 2: Different forms of labour rights breaches culminating in trafficking for forced labour
Methodology 
The information for this report was provided by Eurofound’s network of European correspondents who are experts in
the relevant areas and based in all 28 EU Member States and Norway. The network provides national expertise of key
importance for European policy debates, which enables a comparative perspective on developments and for information
to be contextualised at national and European level. National correspondents also reach out to relevant stakeholders such
as governments, public authorities and social partners. 
To gather the required information for this report, Eurofound developed a detailed questionnaire, discussed it with the
authors and sent it to the social partners and national correspondents for comments. The questionnaire (see Annex p. 53)
consists of 10 different thematic categories with open-ended questions where the experts could provide extended
responses. The correspondents completed the questionnaire in English in November 2014. Clarifications were submitted
and responded to during March and April 2015, and all responses were finalised during this period. 
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Correspondents were asked to cover two issues normally covered by separate disciplines: the commercial, legal and
administrative regulations applying to labour market intermediaries, and the multi-disciplinary responses to trafficking
for labour exploitation.
One shortcoming of this study is that while the information included reflects the findings as reported by the experts,
reliable and comparable national statistics were not always available. Moreover, as many of the reports cited by
correspondents were published in a particular country’s language, in many cases the authors of this report relied on the
interpretation and summaries of national correspondents.
Thematic analysis was conducted on both questionnaire responses and literature using NVivo 10 software.
Correspondents were asked to identify what in their view constituted good practice in the context of this enquiry. The
authors also identified aspects of what seemed to represent good practice based on the responses in conjunction with the
other source material.
No primary research at national or transnational level was conducted for this report, although there is clearly a need for
this as the responses demonstrate. In many cases, the responses describe general plans to tackle trafficking or raise
awareness without any specific reference to practical activities or labour market intermediaries. These have not been
reported as they are outside the scope of this report. 
The authors also examined recent papers (published since 2002) and reports on labour intermediation and on trafficking
published by the institutions and agencies of the European Union, International Labour Organization (ILO), United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Council
of Europe, European and national social partners, academic reports and reports from national governments and agencies,
particularly those tasked with monitoring or combating trafficking. 
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As stated in the introduction, labour market intermediary is a generic term used to describe private or public entities or
institutions mediating between the individual seeking employment and the employer needing work to be done. Figure 3
illustrates the most common forms of labour market intermediaries. 
Figure 3: Forms of labour market intermediaries
While the focus of this report is on temporary work agencies (TWAs), labour market intermediaries take many forms,
ranging from large and established international temporary employment agencies to individual recruiters (Strauss, 2015).
Other forms include au pair services and services that facilitate and match students to jobs abroad for the purpose of
cultural and work-related experience. Until recently, intermediaries providing temporary staff were regarded as illegal in
many countries. It has been suggested that temporary agencies spread in the aftermath of the adoption of ILO Convention
181 in 1997, and that regulatory frameworks for them were developed at national level to monitor them (Enright, 2013;
Peck et al, 2005). Countries that had not permitted labour market intermediaries to operate previously have now been
establishing regulations for agencies since 2003 – this is particularly the case with Central and Eastern European
countries. Poland, for example, which is a signatory to Convention181, began to regulate temporary work agencies in
2003 (Voss et al, 2013), while the Czech Republic amended its Employment Act in 2011 to require the regulation of
employment agencies (UN Working Group on Trafficking in Persons, 2015). But the ILO instrument is not the only
factor determining whether temporary work agencies are subject to regulatory arrangements. There may be regulatory
requirements in the newer Member States (post-2003 EU enlargement) despite their not having ratified Convention181
– this is the case with Latvia and Croatia. 
The existence of the diverse forms of labour market intermediaries has raised questions about their role and function in
the labour market, and their usefulness to people’s employment prospects. Both the ILO and EU argue that private
intermediaries can contribute to an efficient functioning of the labour market, while accepting that public employment
services (PES) should retain the authority to implement labour market policy. A report by Green et al (2014) highlights
the important role played by labour market intermediaries in building networks and reducing transaction costs, in
influencing and minimising mismatches on the part of both jobseekers and employers, and in encouraging disengaged
individuals to enter the labour market. Their role is particularly crucial, as they tend to form partnerships with different
organisations and are able to provide advice and guidance on employability. Other reports, however, have shown that
Labour market intermediaries in Europe
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their role is not conclusive. Voss et al (2013), for example, point out that the role of temporary agency work in acting as
a bridge into permanent work may be overstated, as the evidence shows that a significant share of temporary agency
workers are likely to remain in agency work – in particular, people from certain groups such as the long-term
unemployed, people with a migrant background and disabled people – find it more difficult to make transitions into
permanent employment. 
As national regulations restricting labour market intermediaries from operating have declined, it can be seen that
temporary work agencies (TWAs) and employment placement agencies (EPAs) now operate in all EU Member States,
although the market is very different according to country. In some cases, where the market is still evolving, there are
differences between regulatory regimes.
Precisely how significant labour market intermediaries have become in the EU labour market is hard to establish. The
situation is no clearer for EPAs. In some sectors and geographical areas, intermediaries have become strongly associated
with migration and cost reduction as well as flexibility. In developing markets, enterprises have made the transition from
informal to formal enterprises (Pijpers, 2010). However, many informal or unregistered businesses remain, even in long-
established markets. 
Prevalence in the European labour market
Malo and Munoz-Bullon note that, over the last decade, employment in temporary agency work has doubled throughout
Europe. Although the distribution of temporary agency work differs across European countries, some of the prominent
sectors in which temporary agency work is used are services, manufacturing and construction. In the Scandinavian
countries, Spain, Italy and Austria, temporary agency employment has increased at least five-fold and accounts for 1.3%
of the agency employment in the European Union (Malo and Munoz-Bullon, 2006). Similarly, Eurofound’s study on
temporary agency work points out that it is a unique form of employment, based as it is on a triangular relationship
between workers, intermediary agencies and employers (Eurofound, 2002). 
Some studies, for example those carried out by Eurofound (Eurofound, 2002, 2006 and 2009) and others (European
Parliament, 2009, ILO 2011, Voss et al, 2013, IZA, 2013) point to the increase in the TAW sector in Europe over past
years, whereas EuroCiett points out that the penetration rate has remained constant over the past decade. The increase
partly stems from the fact that, in many EU countries, TAW is a form of employment that has become legally regulated
only during the last two decades, following the adoption of the Temporary Agency Work Directive.
However, as Eurofound’s 2002 study underlines, establishing the size of labour market intermediaries by means of
counting the number of agencies or the numbers of workers interacting with them presents difficulties, and it appears not
to have become easier in the meantime. 
According to the Structural Business Statistics (SBS), the number of temporary work agencies (TWAs) operating in
Europe ranges from 32,000 to 33,000, depending on how the sector is defined. Of these, over three-quarters were
concentrated in just four countries: France (over 2,000 enterprises), Germany (almost 4,000), Netherlands (over 6,000)
and 12,000 in the UK (Eichhorst et al, 2013). At the transnational level, a few major players dominate (such as Adecco,
Randstad and Manpower), and while these may also be the largest in national labour markets, there may be many other,
smaller enterprises. In addition, even where there are licensing or registration requirements, many labour market
intermediaries will be operating informally or unlawfully. For example, a 2010 report by Pijpers cites earlier research
showing that there were 5,000 intermediaries operating in the Netherlands reporting recruitment or posting activities
‘that are not entirely, or at all, legal’. 
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Measuring the number of temporary agency workers is problematic because of the intermittent nature of the work. Being
registered with a TWA does not necessarily mean that the worker is employed in any given week. Furthermore, because
of the nature of temporary work, such workers may not work the same number of hours every week. Some will also be
registered with more than one agency, or have another part-time job. The agency employers’ organisation, the
International Confederation of Private Employment Agencies (CIETT), therefore opts for ‘billed hours’ as the best
measure of activity in the sector although, of course, this is not the same as the number of workers engaged in any
particular period. 
A table published by IDEA Consult (Voss et al, 2013) shows trends and employment figures for 2010 in 23 Member
States, based on returns from Eurociett member organisations and European Commission data (no figures are given for
Cyprus, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Malta or Norway). According to these data, the proportion of the national workforce
employed as temporary agency workers ranges from 0.1% (Romania and Greece) up to 3.0% (UK) – although most
countries displayed TAW levels of less than 1%. Four countries had more than 200,000 temporary agency workers: the
UK (1.07 million), Germany (625,000), France (447,000) and the Netherlands (213,000). More recent data published by
CIETT shows that the total number of hours worked in Europe by temporary agency workers dropped sharply from
October 2008, then rose just as sharply from October 2009 to a peak in mid-2010, after which they gradually declined
up to January 2013. The latest figures, for November 2013, show a 1.7% increase.  
The relevance of the economic crisis is worth noting. According to a new report from Eurofound on the TAW sector, an
increase in the number of workers employed as temporary staff is often the sign of a strong economy, as companies are
in need of additional workers in order to react to an increase in demand (Eurofound, 2016). When demand is down,
temporary workers are the first to lose their jobs. These patterns were also present in the context of the 2008 crisis, when
the TAW sector in Europe experienced a decline: then, folllowing some indications of economic recovery (in some
countries), temporary agency work started to increase. One explanation to account for recent increases in the sector
might be the development of temporary agency workers in the newer Member States’ national markets, although these
are small compared with the most significant ones (the UK, the Netherlands, France and Germany).
Table 1 was developed by Eurofound during the preparation of its latest report and is based on data from Eurofound’s
network of European correspondents (Eurofound, 2016).
Table 1: Number of temporary agency work (TAW) companies in 2009 and 2013–2014
Source: Eurofound’s network of European correspondents, 2014
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2009 2013–2014 2009 2013–2014
AT 779 1,062 IE -- 166
BE 140 257 IT 76 78
BG 36 40 LT 75 92
CY 6 13 LU 41 46
CZ 2,214 1,588 LV 50 163
DE 5,714 6,593 MT 8 6
DK 739 512 NL 6,345 6,170
EE 316 462 PL 2,947 5,157
EL -- 9 PT 540 514
ES 333 248 RO 42 389
FI 995 1,098 SE 1,675 2,321
FR 1,500 1,500 SI 152 98
HR 27 71 SK 144 186
HU 916 1,016 UK 15,130 10,535
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The International Confederation of Private Employment Agencies (CIETT) publishes figures for the ‘penetration rate’,
which is defined as the proportion of the workforce engaged in temporary agency work, based on the reports of their
affiliates compared with ILO data for the workforce (CIETT, 2014). This information indicates in which Member States
temporary work agencies (TWAs) are likely to play the most significant role in the domestic labour market. Based on
this data, TWAs in the UK are the most significant, deploying a reported 3.8% of the workforce, followed by the
Netherlands (2.7%), Luxembourg (2.4%), Germany (2.2%) and France (2.0%). Only three other Member States (Austria,
Belgium and Portugal) have a penetration rate of more than 1.5%. 
Most data on EPAs seem to originate with organisations representing enterprises in the sector. Therefore data might not
be as conservative in their estimation as data published by other organisations. For example, the Adecco Global Study
found that 9% of the workers participating in a 24-country survey had received a job offer online, and almost half had
used social media to assist in their job search (a high proportion of the sample were graduates, so this is unlikely to be
representative). Eurostat’s Labour Force Survey records data on job seeking behaviour by the unemployed showing that,
across the EU, 22.5% of the unemployed approached a private ‘employment office’ in 2011. The proportion varied
hugely from more than 40% in the Netherlands to fewer than 2% in Denmark (Eichhorst et al, 2013). However, this
represents only a minority of those actively seeking new employment, it does not provide data on successful job search,
and fails to take account of the arrangements in some Member States, whereby at least some of the functions of the public
employment service (PES) are contracted to private operators.
A report by the Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA), in Germany, also includes data from the Structural Business
Survey which gave a figure of 27,000 enterprises in the NACE sector N781, ‘Activities of employment placement
agencies’. More than one-third of these were located in just two countries, the UK and the Netherlands (IZA, 2013).
A 2014 report by CIETT reveals the number of ‘private employment agencies’, their local branches and directly
employed staff. While, in some countries, these data are restricted to local affiliates of CIETT member organisations,
they do provide some interesting points of comparison. Again, the UK leads the field with more than 18,000 businesses
and 14,000 branches – a difference perhaps explained by online recruitment businesses and the practice of running
several specialist agencies from one address. Germany, France and the Netherlands have large numbers of agencies and
branches, and so appear to be major sites for labour market intermediary activity as well as for TWAs. Of particular
interest is the relatively large number of placement agencies operating in three of the newer Member States: the Czech
Republic, Poland and Slovakia, each of which is reported to have more than 1,000 such businesses. In all these three
countries, labour market intermediaries need licences to operate, and while social partner activity is limited in Poland
and Slovakia, it is more advanced in the Czech Republic. (see Box 2, p. 35) 
None of these figures is likely to reflect the spread of online recruitment sites. A project by the International Trade Union
Confederation (ITUC) considering the role played by the internet in facilitating trafficking for labour exploitation drew
attention to Tjobs, the largest online recruitment platform in Romania (ITUC, 2014). Of the 30,000 applications for jobs
abroad in August 2014, 11,000 of the jobs were in the UK, 4,800 in Germany and 2,800 in France. The principal sector
was hotels and tourism, followed by domestic work, healthcare, agriculture, and restaurants and catering. While this
study was not able to measure the scale of internet recruitment, each of the five countries examined provided at least one
example of a trafficking case involving an online recruiter (2.54MB PDF)). In addition to this study, the annual EU
Anti-Trafficking Day in 2014 concentrated on the links between trafficking and the internet, especially on online
recruitment. A variety of experts, practitioners and advocacy groups met in order to discuss the conference’s theme,
‘Exploring the links between the internet and trafficking in human beings: cyberspace for prevention, not recruitment’.
One of the working groups highlighted that social networking tools are becoming increasingly popular as recruitment
tools alongside pop-ups, chat rooms and spam mail.
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Despite the inconsistencies, unreliability and lack of time series, most commentators seem convinced that the role of
intermediaries in the European labour market is growing. Lifting restrictions or bans in some Member States on the
operation of agencies suggests that they might become more active, with their role therefore becoming increasingly
significant. 
European and international regulations governing labour market intermediaries
Labour market intermediaries play an important role in the EU labour market as they can help foster job creation and
increase workers’ participation and integration in the labour market. This is not only in terms of meeting business needs
for flexibility, but also satisfying the need of employees to reconcile their working and private lives. The European
Parliament and the Council, recognising the differences in the use of temporary agency work across the EU and in order
to protect the legal situation, status and working conditions of temporary agency workers adopted the Temporary Agency
Work Directive in 2008. Member States are asked to establish a framework so that TWAs can effectively create jobs and
develop flexible forms of work. At the same time, the Directive recognises the temporary agency sector as a legitimate
and professional business, and calls for the removal of unnecessary restrictions, permits or bans. 
According to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, free public employment services (PES)
constitute services of general economic interest. Indeed, these services reflect an essential means to safeguard the
fundamental right of access to a free placement service (Eichhorst et al, 2013). PES are increasingly supplemented by
employment placement agencies (EPAs) and, to some extent, by temporary work agencies (TWAs). There is no specific
definition of an employment placement agency (EPA) in European legislation, while a TWA is clearly defined in Article
3.1 (b) of the TAW Directive:
Temporary work agency means any natural or legal person who, in compliance with national law, concludes
contracts of employment or employment relationships with temporary agency workers in order to assign them to
user undertakings to work there temporarily under their supervision and direction.
(European Commission, 2008)
There are a number of directives establishing a direct or indirect link between employers, such as TWAs, and trafficking
for labour exploitation.
Liability of employers
The Anti-Trafficking Directive highlights the liability of employers if they engage in trafficking. Article 5 states that
legal persons, such as employers, have to be held liable for any offences concerning trafficking in human beings. The
liability of legal persons shall not exclude criminal proceedings against natural persons who are ‘perpetrators, inciters or
accessories in the offences’. The sanctions can include non-criminal sanctions such as revoking a licence or closing the
business (Article 6). 
Sanctions against employers
Directive 2009/52/EC provides for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally
staying third-country nationals (the Employers Sanction Directive). The Employers Sanction Directive highlights the
sanctions to be applied to employers (including TWAs) employing third-country nationals who are illegally staying in
the country and/or who have been trafficked.
The Directive prohibits the employment of third-country nationals (meaning those who are not citizens of the EU) who
are illegally staying in the country with the aim of fighting illegal migration. To prevent and tackle illegal employment,
the Directive lays down common standards on sanctions against employers which have to be applied by Member States
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(Article 1). Paragraph 22 establishes the link to the Anti-Trafficking Directive. In serious cases, where third-country
nationals are employed under ‘particularly exploitative conditions [or] the employer knowing that the worker is a victim
of trafficking in human beings’, Member States are obliged to apply criminal penalties.
Directive 2014/36/EU on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of
employment as seasonal workers (the Seasonal Workers Directive) also provides for sanctions against employers who
are in ‘serious breach’ of their obligations under this Directive, from employing seasonal workers from outside the EU
(Article 17). Member States need to ensure the liability of employers to pay compensation to seasonal workers in the
case that the employer is no longer authorised to employ seasonal workers. Authorisation can be withdrawn, for example,
if the employer was previously sanctioned for undeclared and/or illegal work, or if the employer failed to meet its legal
obligations regarding ‘social security, taxation, labour rights, working conditions or terms of employment, as provided
for in applicable law and/or collective agreements’ (Article 9). The Seasonal Workers Directive is not directly linked to
trafficking. Yet the failure of an employer to meet obligations in relation to labour rights, working conditions or terms
of contract can – in serious cases – amount to exploitative working conditions. If linked to fraudulent recruitment
practices, for instance, the employer could be held accountable for trafficking. In both cases authorisation would be
withdrawn and compensation to the seasonal worker would be required.
Exclusion from procurement procedures
Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement (the Public Procurement Directive) establishes rules on procurement for
contracting authorities. Article 57, 1(f) highlights that contracting authorities shall exclude so-called economic operators
from participation in the procurement procedure where it was established that the economic operator was involved in
child labour and other forms of trafficking in human beings, as defined in Article 2 of the Anti-Trafficking Directive.
This means that contracting authorities are obliged to exclude economic operators (such as TWAs) if it has been shown
that they were engaged in trafficking people.
Obligation to guarantee equal treatment of workers
The obligation to guarantee equal employment and working conditions for workers who are engaged with a TWA is
enshrined in Article 5 of the TAW Directive. TWAs are also obliged to comply with Directive 96/71/EC concerning the
posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services (the Posting of Workers Directive). Temporary Work
Agencies (TWAs) have to guarantee posted workers the terms and conditions of employment in the EU Member State
where the work is carried out as laid down by law, regulation or administrative provision, and/or by collective
agreements or arbitration awards. By requiring the equal treatment of workers, the directives aim to prevent misuse and
exploitative practices. Although these provisions do not necessarily contribute to preventing trafficking, they do
contribute to preventing labour exploitation.
There are also two ILO conventions governing employment agencies. The first is Convention No. 96 concerning Fee-
Charging Employment Agencies, which came into force on 18 July 1951. Its aim was to abolish private, for-profit, fee-
charging agencies in favour of establishing public, free employment services and, during any interim period, the
establishment of a licensing system for private agencies. However, most ILO constituents no longer seem to adhere to
the principles of ILO Convention 96. Only four EU Member States remain signed up to it: France, Ireland, Luxembourg
and Malta. A further 10 countries, which had earlier ratified it, have since renounced it: Belgium (in 2005), Finland
(1992), Germany (1992), Italy (2001), Netherlands (2000), Norway (2002), Poland (2009), Portugal (2003), Spain
(2000) and Sweden (1992).
This is because Convention 96 has, to some extent, been supplanted by the 1997 Convention No. 181 concerning
Private Employment Agencies. This requires a system of licensing or certification, prohibits charging workers a fee,
and sets out specific protection for migrant workers recruited or placed in host countries, as well as a system of penalties
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for those agencies which ‘engage in fraudulent practices and abuses’. The application of the convention (and any
derogation from it) should be subject to consultation with the relevant social partners. Convention 181 has been ratified
by 12 Member States: Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain. These countries have to report regularly to the ILO on how they implement the
convention.
The Convention provides a comprehensive definition of labour market intermediaries, referring to them as private
employment agencies (PEAs), to distinguish them from the public employment service (PES) run by national or
local/regional governments:
1. For the purpose of this Convention the term private employment agency means any natural or legal person,
independent of the public authorities, which provides one or more of the following labour market services: 
(a) services for matching offers of, and applications for, employment, without the private employment agency
becoming a party to the employment relationships which may arise therefrom;
(b) services consisting of employing workers with a view to making them available to a third party, who may be a
natural or legal person (referred to below as a ‘user enterprise’) which assigns their tasks and supervises the
execution of these tasks;
(c) other services relating to jobseeking, determined by the competent authority after consulting the most
representative employers and workers organisations, such as the provision of information, that do not set out to
match specific offers of and applications for employment.
Convention 181 is supported by the ILO constituents, as well as by the International Confederation of Private
Employment Agencies (CIETT), who claim that the countries that have ratified it have since enjoyed better protection
for workers (2.46MB PDF), and other benefits, such as:
n lower levels of informal and undeclared work;
n high correlation with democracy;
n more cooperation between public and private employment services;
n greater protection for freedom of association;
n full respect for the right to strike;
n meaningful and constructive social dialogue in the temporary agency work sector;
n better protection of agency workers by forbidding fee-charging;
n better wages for agency workers;
n controlled and mitigated development of the industry. 
As mentioned above, 12 Member States (Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain) have already ratified the convention. France, which has a relatively
big TWA sector, has recently signed the convention and this will come into force on 28 October 2016. Denmark,
Germany, Sweden and the UK have not ratified it, although they each have one of the largest TWA sectors in the EU.  
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The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) also called for wider ratification of Convention 181, in a motion
on migrant workers presented at its 2010 World Congress in Vancouver. The motion highlights the convention’s ban on
charging fees to place workers into a job (61KB PDF). The ITUC statement emphasises that signing Convention 181
should lead to greater compliance by agencies in not charging fees, or demanding other costs, from workers. At the same
time the CIETT’s code of conduct and the longstanding engagement of the TAW industry has also helped in ending fees,
human trafficking and forced labour. As a consequence, the situation of paying for work rather than being paid for work
is less likely due to monitoring systems which ensure implementation and compliance with Convention 181.
National regulations and definitions
This section analyses data on national regulations and definitions, based on information provided in the questionnaire by
national experts who are members of Eurofound’s network of correspondents. The scope of the questionnaire was to
gather information on how labour market intermediaries are defined and regulated. The questionnaire also asked for
information on how labour trafficking is defined and what the social partners are doing to prevent and tackle the issue.
Regulations regarding workers’ conditions, which are permitted in the TAW Directive (such as transfers to permanent –
or at least open-ended – work, treatment on an equal footing to permanent staff, or maximum length of assignments)
were not systematically dealt with in the questionnaire. However, these topics are covered in the IDEA report for
UniEuropa and EuroCiett, (Voss et al, 2013). For example, 10 Member States (including Austria, Bulgaria, Germany,
Netherlands and Poland), continue to restrict the use of temporary work agencies (TWAs) in certain sectors (Voss et al,
2013) and 14 Member States set out a maximum length for assignments. Five countries (Hungary, Ireland, Malta,
Sweden and the UK) derogate from agency workers’ entitlement (if they have open-ended employment contracts) to
equal pay between assignments. This so-called ‘Swedish derogation’ means that if agency workers are paid even a small
retainer between assignments they are considered to be employees of the agency, and there is no requirement for them
to be given pay and conditions comparable with equivalent workers in the client company (after the qualifying period).
This was introduced to accommodate the normal practice in Swedish TWAs.
Based on the information gathered on regulating the operations of labour market intermediaries, it appears that there is
a general consensus by Member States that they require special treatment. Regulatory systems for labour market
intermediaries, particularly those operating as temporary work agencies, are widespread across the 29 countries
examined – even among those who have not signed either ILO Convention. 
However, Member States’ views on this are far from uniform. This might be due to the different environments in which
regulation for labour market intermediaries was developed and adopted. In the expert report on employment agencies
written for the European Parliament, four different environments are outlined:
n a market-driven environment where there is little formal regulation (as in the UK);
n a social dialogue based environment (for example, Denmark or Germany) where there is a balance between
legislation and agreements made by collective bargaining; 
n a legislator-driven environment (for example, Italy or Belgium) where temporary agency work is heavily regulated; 
n emerging markets which show a legislative framework with mixed impact results (as in Poland). (Eichhorst et al,
2013)
This categorisation provides a comprehensive framework, as the categories have been developed to reflect the different
labour market environments within which regulations evolve, and they can be used in the present analysis of the varied
regulatory systems of TWAs in Member States, as reported by Eurofound’s network of correspondents, and illustrated
in Table 2. 
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Licensing and registration of labour market intermediaries
The most frequent condition for labour market intermediaries to operate legitimately in Member States is to be licensed
or registered. Licensing requires some prior authority to test qualifications and other requirements. Registration simply
requires the LMI to notify the appropriate authority, which will then list it (see ‘Definition of key terms’ on p. 9). 
Countries use regulation to varying degrees. According to Peck et al (2005), some European countries such as France,
Germany and the Scandinavian countries have been cautious about weakening regulation. Countries like Italy and
Greece started to introduce regulatory frameworks conducive to temporary staffing only after Convention 181 was
passed in 1997, whereas other countries, such as Belgium, France and the Netherlands, introduced regulatory
frameworks much earlier.
In the case of the Netherlands, although the licence system was abolished in 1998 as part of market liberalisation, a
registration system was introduced in 2012 in order to tackle illegal practices. In addition, a government-led approach
to ‘chain liability’ was introduced, whereby all companies over a staffing agency all the way up to the company at the
top of the chain can be held liable. Joint liability is the default regime in Dutch subcontracting chains. In addition to the
mandatory registration with public authorities, temporary work agencies (TWAs) can volunteer for certification which
entails passing an audit by the Foundation for Employment Standards (SNA). Once a TWA has acquired a SNA
certificate, the staffing agency and all enterprises above in the supply chain are partially released from joint liability. As
the company at the top of the chain benefits from the certification scheme, major companies started to demand
certification of TWAs in their subcontracting chains (Gordon, 2015).
According to the research carried out for this report, most Member States have some form of licensing, while over half
of the countries (Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain) require all TWAs – as a minimum – to have authorisation prior to
commencing activity. A further seven countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway and Poland)
have registration systems (including the Netherlands where – as stated above – this was reintroduced in 2012, having
previously been abolished in 1998). Five countries (Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania and Sweden) had neither and,
in the UK, most labour market intermediaries were not required to register or become licensed, (although agencies do
require licensing to operate in the agriculture and food processing sectors). Table 2 summarises the different types of
regulation systems for TWAs using the categorisation drawn up by Eichhorst et al (2013) outlining the different labour
market environments. Countries may use more than one regulatory measure.
Table 2: Types of national regulation for temporary work agencies (TWAs) by environment
Source: Eurofound’s network of European correspondents, 2014
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Licensing Registration
No prior
licensing/registration
Certification
schemes
Market-driven environment with little
formal regulation
CY, MT IE, UK (except in agriculture
and food processing where a
licence is required)
Environment with a balance between
legislation and collective agreements
AT, DE NO, NL (reintroduced in
2012) DK
FI, SE NL
Legislative-driven environment with
strong regulation
EL, PT, ES, LU BE, FR, IT
Emerging markets with mixed legislative
frameworks
HR, CZ, HU, LT, RO, SK,
SI
BG, PL EE, LT
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As Table 2 shows, there is great variation between Member States in terms of their regulation for TWAs and within the
different market environments in which they operate. For example, in more liberalised and less regulated market
environments such as Ireland and the UK, no registration or licensing is required. In Scandinavian countries, where there
is a balance between legislation and collective agreements, the regulation system varies, with Denmark and Norway
requiring registration, and Finland and Sweden requiring none. This difference can be explained by the latter introducing
policy changes towards greater flexibility. In Sweden, private temporary work agencies have been allowed to operate
since 1993 and restrictions were lifted for temporary work contracts, allowing them, for example, to ease a temporary
workload or to fill temporary vacancies (Jonung et al, 2009). Similar changes have occurred in Finland since the 1990s
although, even before the TAW Directive, temporary workers with successive contracts in Finland were entitled to
benefits similar to those enjoyed by workers with permanent contracts. However, both countries allow a degree of
regulation through collective agreements (Jonung et al, 2009).
The picture is less clear in the case of employment placement agencies (EPAs). In some countries, these require licensing
(for example, Austria, Cyprus, Greece and Poland) or registration in the same way as TWAs – sometimes with less
demanding conditions. In other countries, such as Germany, for example, EPAs are not subject to any special
requirements. Other Member States have introduced changes in legislation to allow for greater flexibility: for example,
in Spain, where since 2014, prior authorisation is no longer a prerequisite. 
Where licences exist, they may be subject to time limits or periodic renewal. For example, in Luxembourg, the licences
may be revised at any moment and approval needs to be obtained by the relevant Ministry. However, if a TWA has
practised for three years without interruption, then approval may be given for an indeterminate period. Similarly, in
Germany, the local branch of the Federal Employment Agency is responsible for issuing licences to TWAs. Licences are
issued initially for 12 months and then renewed for a further two years. If a TWA operates for a continuous three-year
period, an open-ended licence may be granted. 
Furthermore, the most regularly mentioned condition for gaining a licence to operate a LMI is that the proprietor or agent
should fulfil certain requirements (mentioned in 11 countries: Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia). Apart from nationality (where this was mentioned, it usually
required citizenship of the European Economic Area (EEA)), the most common requirement is that they should not have
any criminal convictions or civil violations (in some cases these are limited to recent violations) relating to social
security, unpaid wages or debts. In addition, some countries require certain levels of professional qualification. Cyprus,
for example, stipulates an appropriate degree or diploma and, in Austria, anyone wanting to operate an EPA has to have
passed the job employment services exam. Others countries have requirements that are less specific. Italy, for example,
requires ‘adequate professional skills’, and in Greece qualifications must be supplemented by a minimum length of
professional experience. In Romania, granting licences depends on certain conditions, such as not having any debts
registered with the state or local budget, not having been sanctioned in the last 24 months, and being able to provide a
financial guarantee.
Financial guarantees and inspections 
The second most frequent stipulation is that the enterprise should provide a minimum level of financial guarantee against
any shortfall in wages, social security or taxes. This was reported by nine countries: Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy,
Luxemburg, Norway, Portugal, Romania and Slovenia. These may take the form of deposits, insurance policies or bank
guarantees, and range from €3,500 (NOK 30,000) in Norway and up to €119,000 in France. In other countries, the
guarantee is related to turnover or multiples of a typical worker’s wage – for example, 25 gross minimum salaries for a
year in Romania, or 200 minimum salaries plus 35% in Portugal (for TWAs the equivalent figure for EPAs is 13 salaries).
Greece and Italy, meanwhile, require minimum levels of share capital: in the case of TWAs, this amounts to €176,000
in Greece and €600,000 in Italy. 
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Regulatory systems may also include special reporting or inspection regimes. In some cases, this may simply represent
the application of sectoral collective bargaining agreements, as in the case of Luxembourg, where the application of the
agency sector agreement can be enforced by the Labour Inspectorate. After the permit is granted, employers need to
apply the national collective agreement of the temporary work sector (minimum wage) and also pay social contributions
on these wages. The Labour Inspectorate (ITM) is responsible for the monitoring to ensure that TWAs adhere to the
regulations that apply to the sector. 
In Greece, inspectors will visit and interview the proprietor before a licence is issued. A similar arrangement originally
applied in the UK’s agriculture and food processing industries where inspectors from the Gangmasters Licensing
Authority (GLA) carried out inspections as part of the licensing process. This no longer applies in all cases. Agencies
may also be required to notify social security authorities of temporary work assignments – this is the case in Bulgaria,
France and Lithuania, for example. Finally, in some cases, PES are notified of placements: in France, for example,
temporary work agencies must send the Labour Inspectorate a monthly update of concluded employment contracts
(Relevé mensuel des contrats) indicating the start and the end of tasks undertaken by the temporary workers. Similar
rules apply in Italy and Spain. 
Three countries – Cyprus, Italy and Slovenia – also require labour market intermediaries to have designated premises
and sometimes to show they have technical equipment, presumably to prevent letter-box companies and to enable
physical inspections. In France, a TWA can be set up anywhere but must occupy an independent office, as it cannot be
a part of other business activities.
Taken together, the current regulations show that, in most EU countries, labour market intermediaries are regarded as
being in some way exceptional, requiring specific regulations and controls. It appears that the main aims of these
regulatory regimes are to ensure that the authorities are aware of who is operating as an LMI, with TWAs being in some
ways regarded as more of a concern than labour market intermediaries operating solely as placement agencies. In
Cyprus, this has been made explicit in the law to combat trafficking (Ν.13(Ι)2012) which came into force in 2012. This
permits the government to revoke the employment agency licence if the person responsible for the agency, the director,
or owner is convicted for any offence under the anti-trafficking law. 
Moreover, the countries recognise the potential risk to both workers’ and the state’s finances of allowing unrestricted
access to this type of activity, hence both qualification requirements and financial bonds or guarantees are required.
However, the Eurofound correspondent’s response for the Netherlands did point out that since the abolition of the
licensing system in the 1990s, there was a massive rise in the number of labour market intermediaries operating in
agriculture (from fewer than 50 to more than 1,600). 
Cross-border activity
Labour market intermediaries are becoming increasingly important in facilitating international mobility. A number of
reports point to the role of both recruiters and temporary agencies who are operating across borders to provide workers
for food processing, construction, domestic work, agriculture and manufacturing jobs (for example, Fudge and Strauss,
2014, Enright, 2013, Pijpers, 2010). However, as a 2015 report for the ILO points out, there may be an overlap between
facilitation and exploitation. Highlighting the valuable services provided by the recruitment process – interviewing,
matching with vacancies, facilitating visas and arranging transport – the report also points to the dangers of the abuses
to which the sector is prey:
Unscrupulous recruiters charge fees for every possible service related to migration, discriminate on the basis of
gender and age, make false promises about the job on offer in the destination country to increase the amount that
migrants are willing to pay, or lend money at usurious rates to cover these outsized expenses.
(Gordon, 2015)
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Furthermore, problems may arise where regulatory regimes may differ between the sending and host country. To give
some examples: it may, in some countries, be normal for recruitment agencies to charge jobseekers a fee, whereas this
might be unlawful in the country to which the worker is deployed. Or, where deposits might be required to register and
operate in one country, there may be no such requirement in another. It is not clear whether a ban on operating an LMI
in one country (by virtue of convictions or previous non-compliance) will prevent an EEA citizen from setting up a
business in another Member State. To some extent, this might be balanced by the need to have a licence (irrespective of
the country of origin) in order to operate as an LMI in a country where licensing applies – but only if there is sufficient
international cooperation between regulators. 
For example, in Belgium, TWAs may post workers into Belgium only if the agency is licensed – but this only applies in
the Brussels and Wallonia regions, not in the Flemish region. Similar restrictions apply to EPAs (Eichhorst et al, 2013).
Norway, however, simply requires that enterprises that do not have a registered office in the country provide the name
and address of their ‘permanent representative’ in Norway. Estonian immigration law seeks to regulate temporary hiring
in certain professions (au pairs, experts, advisers or consultants, equipment fitters, skilled workers or seasonal work
involving the processing of primary agricultural products), by requiring that they are paid at least 24% on top of the
average Estonian salary for that category (or twice the average for specialists).
The approach adopted in Germany is similar to that in Belgium. All agencies require permission from the public
employment service (PES), and this applies to those based in other Member States. Posting from TWAs from outside the
EEA is not permitted, and the PES may also forbid recruitment from outside the EEA in certain industries and
occupations. Eichhorst et al (2013) list several of these: seasonal work, holiday jobs for students, domestic work,
language teaching.
Austria has detailed requirements for enterprises based abroad in the EEA to post workers, such as prior notification to
the Central Coordination Office for the Control of Illegal Employment (Zentrale Koordinationsstelle – ZKO) pursuant
to the Employment of Foreigners Act (Auslaenderbeschäftigungsgesetz, AuslBG) and to the Employment Contract Law
Adaptation Act (Arbeitsvertragsrechts-Anpassungsgesetz, AVRAG) which apply to TWAs, as does the requirement to
keep relevant documents available and to provide information on pay (in German) at the workplace. Greece has
procedures requiring EPAs to notify the authorities of the intention to provide services (recruitment) in the country, and
either to establish premises which can be inspected, or to notify the authorities of clients in Greece and
inspection/licensing authorities in the EPAs’ home country.
According to Gordon (2015), host countries for the most part pay ‘little attention to routine problems with recruitment,
which usually occur outside of their sight and beyond their jurisdiction’, preferring to focus on the worst cases (those
known to feature forced labour,  for example) and the best (codes of practice aimed at large enterprises with brands to
protect).
Labour market intermediaries and trafficking for labour exploitation in EU Member States
The international, European and national regulations are aimed at preventing and tackling trafficking in human beings.
Member States are bound by the EU Anti-Trafficking Directive (2011/36/EU), which sets minimum standards for the
definition of trafficking in human beings. Variations exist in relation to the definitions of labour exploitation in the EU
Member States. According to the Directive, labour market intermediaries are to be held liable for engaging in trafficking
activities. The Directive is clear regarding Member States’ obligation to initiate criminal proceedings against legal as
well as natural persons who are perpetrators, inciters, or accessories in the offences (or their attempts to commit one)
concerning trafficking in human beings (Article 5). 
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National definitions related to trafficking for labour exploitation
All Member States are bound by the EU Anti-Trafficking Directive and, as mentioned above, the Directive sets minimum
standards for the definition of trafficking in human beings. As regards trafficking for labour exploitation, Article 2 lists
the exploitation forms of forced labour or services (including begging), slavery or practices similar to slavery, and
servitude. There is no further definition given of forms of exploitation. The further interpretation of this is up to Member
States’ legislators and courts. The study shows that the most common approach to define trafficking for labour
exploitation in the EU Member States is to refer to trafficking for the purpose of forced labour in the legislation and,
while doing so, adopt the definition of ‘forced labour’ provided by ILO Convention 29 which states that ‘forced or
compulsory labour shall mean all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty
and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.’(Article 2(1))
Finland, for example, prohibits trafficking for forced labour in the Criminal Code, but gives no further definition.
Instead, background documents to the legislation refer to ILO Convention 29 and the European Convention of Human
Rights. Similarly, Slovakia prohibits forced labour and forced services in its Constitution, but the Constitutional Court
relies on judgements of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to determine its parameters. In Sweden, the
National Police Board (NPB) is responsible for reporting developments in trafficking in Sweden. The NPB uses the
definition of forced labour found in Article 2 in ILO Convention 29. Other countries transcribe the definition from ILO
Convention 29 directly into legislation (the criminal code, the labour code or specific anti-trafficking legislation). This
applies in Italy, Lithuania, Portugal and Romania, for example.
Other countries have developed their own definitions, which comply with ILO Convention 29 while reflecting the
national legal context, and sometimes experience. A French law introduced into the Criminal Code in 2013 includes the
use of threats or violence into its definition, but also relates this to unpaid work or work for ‘payment clearly unrelated
to the importance of the work done’. In Denmark, threats and the use of force whose purpose is ‘exploiting another
person’ qualify, but exploitation itself is not defined. From the information gathered for this report it appears that much
may be left to judicial discretion (or that of police and prosecutors). Related concerns were summarised in the UK
response, but would seem to apply more widely: 
The definition and scope of forced labour are poorly understood, including differences between human trafficking,
slavery and exploitation. Consensus is needed on forced labour indicators relevant for assessing the scope and scale
of forced labour ... and to assist legal proceedings.
In contrast, some legislation specifies labour exploitation and makes the relationship between trafficking and forced
labour explicit. This is the case, for example, with the Irish Human Trafficking legislation:
Labour exploitation means, in relation to a person (including a child):
(a) subjecting the person to forced labour (including forcing him or her to beg), (b) forcing the person to render
services to another person, or (c) enslavement of the person or subjecting him or her to servitude or a similar
condition or state; and (c) ‘forced labour’ means a work or service which is exacted from a person under the menace
of any penalty and for which the person has not offered himself or herself voluntarily
(Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2008) 
In Austria, an amendment to §104a of the Austria Criminal Code (StGB) was passed by the parliament in 2013. This
paragraph defines human trafficking for the purpose of exploitation. The amendment specifies the meaning of
exploitation covering sexual exploitation, harvesting organs, forced begging, forced commission of a crime and, for the
first time, also explicitly mentions the exploitation of labour (in German, 166KB PDF). The explanatory
memorandum to the amendment of §104a highlights that exploitation of labour is different to slavery and that it includes
© European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2016
26
the ruthless exploitation of people and the ‘lasting oppression of vital interests’  (Ministerial proposal for the amendment
of the penal code for sexual offences, 2013). According to Gallagher (2015), differentiating labour exploitation from
slavery may help those at the front line to investigate and prosecute cases more easily.
Table 3 provides an illustrative overview of the main definitions reported by the correspondents in some Member States.
For a full overview of the national definitions in relation to trafficking in the 28 EU Member States, see the report on
case law published by the European Commission (European Commission, 2015). 
Table 3: Summary of national definitions related to trafficking for labour exploitation
Source: Eurofound’s network of European correspondents, 2014
The table shows that many of the responses feature the ILO Convention 29, suggesting that the majority of Member
States use it as their regulatory framework. Furthermore, respondents in Ireland and Austria specifically mention
legislation on labour exploitation based on trafficking and forced labour.
Role and involvement of labour market intermediaries in trafficking for labour exploitation 
Regardless of the obligation of labour market intermediaries to refrain from trafficking in human beings, some seem to
engage in trafficking for labour exploitation by means of fraudulent and deceptive recruitment or through exploiting the
vulnerable position of individuals. The present research has highlighted some of the sectors in which LMI trafficking
activity is more likely to occur, and the country of origin of exploited workers, as summarised in Table 4.
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ILO Convention 29 Most common approach for national legislation regarding definitions
Examples:
Finland: Prohibits trafficking for forced labour in the Criminal Code, but gives no further definition. Instead
background documents to the legislation refer to ILO Convention 29 and the European Convention of
Human Rights.
Slovakia: Prohibits forced labour and forced service in its Constitution, but the Constitutional Court would
rely on judgements of the European court of Human rights (ECHR) to determine its parameters.
Sweden: The National Police Board is responsible for reporting developments in trafficking in Sweden and
uses the ILO definition to classify cases.
Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania: Definition from ILO Convention 29 directly transposed into legislation
(the criminal code, the labour code or specific anti-trafficking legislation). 
Member States definitions, which
comply with ILO Convention 29
Examples:
France: From 2013 the Criminal Code includes the use of threats or violence in its definition, but also
relates this to unpaid work or work for ‘payment clearly unrelated to the importance of the work done’. 
Denmark: Threats and the use of force whose purpose is ‘exploiting another person’ qualify, but exploitation
itself is not defined.
Legislation specifies labour exploitation
and makes the relationship between
trafficking and forced labour explicit
Ireland: Irish Human Trafficking legislation.
Austria: Amendment to §104a of the Austria Criminal Code.
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Table 4: Sectors with problems regarding trafficking for labour exploitation
Source: Eurofound’s network of European correspondents, 2014
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Country Sectors
AT Construction
Personal care 
BE Construction 
Industrial cleaning 
Car wash sector 
Catering industry 
Retail trade (annual report of the Federal Anti-trafficking Centre for 2013)
CZ Domestic work
DE Construction (in Hungary report, also national report)
DK Waste/recycling (‘green’ sector)
Cleaning
Domestic work
EL Agriculture
ES Seasonal agriculture
Textiles
Domestic work
Construction 
Hospitality 
Europe Agriculture
Construction
Textiles
Hospitality
Domestic work (GRETA, 2014)
FI Seasonal migrant work 
Ethnic restaurants 
Beauty/hair salons 
General service sector 
FR Construction
Catering
Domestic work
IT Construction
Agriculture
LU Catering 
Construction 
NL Agriculture (in Hungary report)
PT Agriculture/fruit picking
RO Construction 
Transport 
Agriculture 
Food industry 
Hospitality
SE Hospitality
Cleaning 
Construction 
Agriculture and forestry (berry-picking)
Retail 
Report repairs 
Service
TWA sector 
SI Construction
UK Agriculture and food processing
Construction
Hospitality (Oxfam 2009, cited by Enright, 2013) 
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Table 4 identifies the sectors most commonly having problems with trafficking for labour exploitation and in most
countries these are construction, catering and hospitality, domestic work and agriculture. Other sectors include retail in
Sweden and Belgium, beauty and hair salons in Finland, transport in Romania and waste and recycling in Denmark. 
Given the limited availability of data for cases of trafficking for labour exploitation or for the size of the LMI sector, it
is difficult to show a statistical correlation between the two. However, the anecdotal evidence is strong, and the data
gathered for this report and the broader literature provide many supporting examples of the existence of certain practices,
although not on how widespread they are. Some of these are discussed below. A study of trafficking conducted in
Portugal and published in 2012 cited the human trafficking activities of the Portuguese recruitment company DFRM
International Services SA with origins in Israel (IEEI, 2012). Although this was closed in 2011, its owners created
another company to continue the activity. The report also states that the role of EPAs in the trafficking of human beings
is on the increase.
The Estonian report produced for the ADSTRINGO project – ‘Addressing trafficking for labour exploitation through
improved partnerships, enhanced diagnostics and intensified organisational approaches’ – highlights some issues related
to deceptive recruitment. ADSTRINGO was a two-year project, funded by the Prevention of and Fight against Crime
Programme (ISEC) of the European Commission, and developed to prevent trafficking for labour exploitation through
national and regional partnerships of stakeholders that are in a position to address situations of trafficking and labour
exploitation. Research shows that Estonian workers have also paid recruitment fees. The research in Finland and Poland
shows that victims are misled or even deceived by recruiters and intermediaries who make false promises and paint rosy
images about the terms of work, length of employment and salary. Sometimes no work is provided in the destination
country, or the work is only part time despite the promise of a full-time job (Markina and Kask, 2013). Other similar
examples were cited in Finland, where Chinese workers in the cleaning sector had been subject to fees by intermediaries
in China, and nurses had similarly been charged illicit fees by agencies in South East Asia (cited in Ollus et al, 2013). 
Deceptive recruitment by labour market intermediaries (where the pay, work or conditions fail to meet the promises
made on recruitment) are reported in Hungary for agricultural workers going to the Netherlands (in 2012), and
construction workers recruited online to work on the new Berlin Airport (in 2011). In both cases, salaries were underpaid
or unpaid. In Bulgaria, workers were recruited to work in Germany. The LMI was found by investigators to have made
workers work in inhumane conditions for little or no salary. It was also found that the LMI – although registered in
Germany – had not provided legitimate contracts and, in some cases, had sent workers to Poland instead, where they
were obliged to sign contracts written in Polish. 
In Belgium, the regulatory framework for the operation of TWAs is tight, and some regulations apply to the whole of the
Belgian territory and are based on the contractual relationship between the temporary work agency, the worker and the
user company. One example is the case of Chinese recruiters who sent workers via Russia to work in restaurants in
Belgium in exchange for very high fees. The conditions were found by the court to constitute trafficking, as they included
12 hours of work each day, poor accommodation (in an attic), almost complete dependence on the ‘employer’, and
irregular, incomplete or no salary at all. Another example, also from Belgium, constitutes one of the few cases where the
country’s Labour Inspectorate was able to establish the violations committed by an LMI, brought legal proceedings and
won the case. 
Some examples also demonstrate the difficulty that may be encountered in identifying whether an LMI has been
involved. The Migrants Rights Centre Ireland (MRCI) cites the example of a Vietnamese man recruited through ‘a
wealthy friend’ for what he believed was a gardening job in Europe. Having been brought into Ireland he was put to work
tending cannabis plants, being locked in the building and brought food once a week. When this was uncovered by the
police, he was charged with possession of the plants. It was not clear what the relationship was between the original
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recruiter and those operating the cannabis farm, or whether there was LMI involvement (MRCI, 2013). In the Czech
Republic, the Commission’s ‘Together Against Trafficking in Human Beings’ website suggests that organised crime
groups who traffic workers out of the Ukraine and Russia were no longer confiscating documents and ‘tend to present
themselves as legally functioning entities such as recruitment agencies’. The well-known case of the Chinese
cockle-pickers who died in the UK in 2004 was also problematic (coming before the Gangmasters Licensing Act came
into force), in that the gangmaster was convicted of manslaughter, but the company trading the cockles which they
picked faced no charges, although it might be argued that the gangmaster was acting as an agent for them (Oxfam, 2009,
cited in Enright, 2013).
The examples of exploitation set out in the previous section show that there are a number of examples of labour market
intermediaries engaging in exploitative practices and, in some cases, trafficking for labour exploitation. Due to the
hidden nature of the phenomenon of trafficking one might assume that there are numerous cases which are still left
undetected. In some countries, trafficking offences may be obscured by conflicting policy objectives. For example, a
focus on the issue of ‘social dumping’ (mentioned, for example, by Norway and Belgium) might lead to a focus on
undercutting wages, rather than on the more wide-ranging plight of those being trafficked for the purpose of exploitation.
In countries of emigration, an association of trafficking with migration may lead to the conviction that extreme
exploitation is an issue only for foreign workers (in Croatia and Latvia), which it is not. Latvian NGO Marta has
highlighted rural-to-urban trafficking for labour exploitation. Table 5 summarises the most notable examples identified
by the network of European correspondents.
Table 5: Overview of labour market intermediaries’ engagement in activities related to trafficking
Source: Eurofound’s network of European correspondents, 2014
As well as providing some examples of LMI trafficking activities, Table 5 gives a flavour of the complex issues around
trafficking. The duplicity often starts at the recruitment stage, where workers are trafficked specifically for labour
purposes. Generally, they pay fees to labour market intermediaries in their home country and, in some cases, have their
passports or other identification confiscated, leaving the victim in the vulnerable position of being unable to seek help.
In other cases, the deception is related to working conditions involving payment, signing contracts in a foreign language,
as well as poor living conditions and substandard hygiene. 
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Trafficking for labour exploitation Portugal: Study published in 2012 (IEEI, 2012) cited human trafficking activities of Portuguese recruitment
company DFRM International Services SA with origins in Israel.
Deceptive recruitment practices Estonia: ADSTRINGO project highlights that Estonian workers in Finland and Poland were misled or even
deceived by recruiters and intermediaries.
Finland: Chinese workers in the cleaning sector were charged fees by intermediaries in China.
Deceptive recruitment:  where the pay,
work or conditions fail to meet the
promises made on recruitment
Hungary: In 2012, temporary Hungarian workers in the agricultural sector in Netherlands reported that they
were promised decent working and earning conditions but these were not fulfilled. These included missing
payments, poor accommodation, lack of water and other facilities. 
Bulgaria: An LMI was found by investigators to have made Bulgarian workers in Germany work in inhumane
conditions for little or no salary. It was also found that the LMI, although registered in Germany, had no
legitimate contracts there and, in some cases, had sent workers to Poland instead, where they were obliged
to sign contracts written in Polish.
Belgium: Recruiters in China sent workers via Russia to work in restaurants in Belgium in exchange for very
high fees. The conditions were found by the court to constitute trafficking. 
Difficulty that may be encountered in
identifying whether a labour market
intermediary was involved
Ireland: The Migrants Rights Centre Ireland (MRCI) cites the example of a Vietnamese worker deceived at
recruitment stage who ended up tending cannabis plants under poor working conditions. When discovered
by the police, it was not clear whether there was labour market intermediary involvement (MRCI, 2013).
Czech Republic: Organised crime groups trafficking workers were no longer confiscating documents but
presented themselves as legal recruitment agencies instead.
UK: The gangmaster in the case of the Chinese cockle-pickers was convicted of manslaughter, the
company trading the cockles which they picked faced no charges, although it might be argued that the
gangmaster was acting as an agent for them (Oxfam, 2009, cited in Enright, 2013).
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In terms of regulating or monitoring LMI activities, as discussed above, most countries have a form of regulatory system
such as rules on licensing or registration, which vary depending on the national market environment and how liberalised
it is. There is also social partner activity in terms of raising awareness, provision of training and cooperation with the
state (for example, with the labour inspectorate or the police). The experts’ responses and existing literature have
highlighted three main areas that can help to tackle trafficking in human beings where labour market intermediaries are
involved:
n enforcement of LMI and anti-trafficking related rules and regulations;
n support of social partners’ activities;
n policy coherence and cooperation.
According to some commentators, more emphasis should be put on understanding and tackling the issue of trafficking
for labour exploitation. In some Member States – for example, in Spain – previous work gravitated towards trafficking
for sexual exploitation and, as a result, there is a gap in understanding and in developing policies and regulations in the
area of trafficking for labour exploitation. Within this context, other experts discussed the need for further research to
understand the characteristics and trends of trafficking or the needs of workers in specific sectors such as domestic
migrant workers, an area of work that is often undeclared and hidden (McKay et al, 2011). Other questionnaire responses
focused on the importance of legislation and changes in the national legislative system, for example, providing
protection for those that decide to testify (for example, in Romania), or more preventative regulatory measures to
increase public awareness and understanding of trafficking and of the victims’ situation (for example, in Croatia). Further
improvements can include the following: workers receiving better information on local employment legislation and
rights, and the role and function of trade unions; strengthening contractual agreements; strengthening the role of the
Labour Inspectorate; and increasing legislation on other aspects such as health and safety, as many temporary agency
workers are often in precarious, risky jobs. The following chapter will provide more in-depth information on social
partner activities in this area. 
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Given the increasing number of issues related to fraudulent recruitment and exploitative labour practices, the social
partners have in recent years acknowledged their responsibility and are increasingly voicing their concern. 
At international level, the social partners for the temporary agency sector, Uni Global and CIETT, concluded a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on temporary agency work in 2008. As well as agreeing on the potential value
of temporary agency workers in making the labour market operate more efficiently, both sides supported a regulatory
framework that aims to prevent agency work undercutting other workers’ rights and conditions. The MoU also
specifically dealt with trafficking, highlighting the need to:
Promote quality standards within the industry and prevent unfair competition by fraudulent agencies and/or user
companies, counter abuses and illegal practices and fight human trafficking. 
(Uni Global and CIETT, 2008)
It is worth noting that on the employers’ side this was signed by CIETT’s corporate members (Adecco, Kelly Services,
Manpower, Olympia Flexgroup AG, Randstad, USG People), rather than by CIETT on behalf of their national affiliate
associations – implying immediate support and ownership of the MoU. 
CIETT recently adopted a new Code of Conduct for its corporate and national affiliates. This includes the requirement
that private employment services should observe legislation and official guidance, and explicitly prohibits the use of
forced or bonded labour, human trafficking and child labour (348 KB PDF). It also prohibits charging fees to
jobseekers and workers. Complaints about breaches by an affiliated LMI must first be dealt with by the relevant national
association (CIETT, 2015).
Some individual, multinational labour market intermediaries also have their own codes of conduct. Adecco’s code of
conduct, for example, ‘recognises the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work’ (adopted in 1998)
and aims to eliminate all forms of forced or compulsory labour. In its code of conduct, Manpower states that it stands
against practices that exploit people and that limit opportunities for individuals, especially the most vulnerable in
society, to fully enjoy dignity at work. It affirms that it aims to reduce abuse, focusing on creating awareness of, and
opposition to, the following: exploitation of disadvantaged individuals; human trafficking; forced labour; child labour;
illegally low wages for vulnerable individuals and unsafe working conditions.
Other, similar viewpoints have been expressed by smaller labour market intermediaries. Some of the national social
partners across the EU Member States and Norway have also expressed their views on trafficking and examples of their
stated viewpoints are given in Box 1.  
Social partner actions to combat
trafficking for labour exploitation 
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Box 1: Sample views of social partners against trafficking
n ‘The social partners are naturally against illegal labour exploitation’ (Denmark)
n ‘Social partners clearly and strongly condemn trafficking in human beings for labour exploitation’ (Austria)
n ‘The position of the social partners is clearly opposed to every form of exploitation and trafficking of human beings,
and they coordinate their efforts in order to effectively deal with the phenomenon’ (Cyprus)
n ‘No trade union worth its name can agree to, or accept, exploitative working conditions and or human trafficking
for labour purposes’ (Malta).
Source: Eurofound’s network of European correspondents, 2014
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ILO Convention 181 recommends that LMI regulation should be subject to consultation with social partners. According
to the findings of the correspondents, the EU and national social partners have been engaged in debates and related
policy development on temporary work agencies, trafficking and related matters such as migration. The French response
illustrates this well, citing the support of the General Confederation of Labour (CGT) – and of several associations and
NGOs – for the strike action of undocumented workers in the catering, cleaning and construction industries, denouncing
the fact that they were in undeclared work.
The next section discusses in more detail social partner actions to tackle trafficking by labour market intermediaries for
labour exploitation. It presents activities based on dialogue, joint activities and campaigns and the social partners’
engagement in public discussions and policy debates. Table 6 provides a summary of these actions.
Table 6: Summary of social partner activities against trafficking for labour exploitation by labour market
intermediaries
Source: Eurofound’s network of European correspondents, 2014
*Source: Voss et al (2013)
Table 6 underlines the fact that some countries have a sectoral collective agreement in place. There is also increased
activity through cooperation with NGOs, which demonstrates their increasing role, particularly in the period after the
1980s (Paraskevopoulou and McKay, 2015). Eurofound’s network of correspondents reported less activity in the area of
social partner initiation and engagement in policy debates on trafficking for labour exploitation.
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Tools and practices used by the social partners
Sectoral collective agreements in the TWA sector * AT, BE, DK, ES, FI, FR, DE, IT, LU, NL, SE
Joint initiatives which build on already existing
bargaining arrangements
DK, IT, NL, CZ
Engagement of social partners UK, IE, RO
Dialogue with the government HR, HU
Activities with government agencies and/or NGOs AT, CZ, IE, NO, SI, NL, BG, UK, HR, LV, RO 
Information or awareness raising campaigns DE, FI, HU
Activities of workers’ organisations
Establishing system for handling complaints SI, NL, CY, IT
Information campaigns DE, ES, UK, FI, SE
Transnational cooperation BG-DE; HU-UK-RO
Activities of employers’ organisations and companies
Developing codes of conduct FI, DK, NL
Providing information and educational material PL, CZ
Social partners’ initiation of and engagement in public discussions and policy debates
General approach against trafficking for labour
exploitation
NO, AT, ES
Related to labour market intermediaries RO
Increased inspections or call for increased inspections CY, CZ, ES, FI, SI, HU
Use of media BG (trade unions), EL (employer associations)
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Dialogue, joint initiatives and campaigns of social partners 
The information in this section on social partner engagement on the issue of trafficking for labour exploitation in the
LMI sector is derived from the responses to the questionnaire, with input from Eurofound’s network of European
correspondents. Social dialogue is one of the most important tools used by social partners to shape and influence the
legislation and policymaking of national governments. 
In Croatia, the social partners’ engagement on trafficking and labour market intermediaries – and on labour market issues
in general – via dialogue with the government is limited. Consequently, this issue is relatively neglected in social
partners’ activities in this country. However, there are many practical examples of engagement with trafficking in sectors,
or among workers, who were likely to have been recruited or employed by labour market intermediaries. There are also
initiatives aimed at labour market intermediaries which would, by implication, have an impact on trafficking. Some are
related to serious issues of exploitation which, it could be argued, do not involve or qualify as trafficking, and these have
been included as well. Other examples of campaigns on undocumented migration, so-called ‘social dumping’, or
trafficking for other forms of exploitation which are related to this report, but which are not its main theme, are not
included. 
Several Member States have collective agreements covering temporary agency workers. Eurofound, in their report on
temporary agency workers and collective bargaining, identified sectoral collective bargaining in 11 countries: Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden (Eurofound,
2009). This remained the case up to 2013, when Voss et al published their report for the European social partners for the
TAW sector (UNI Europa and Euro CIETT). While they highlighted the same 11 Member States where a sectoral
collective bargaining structure existed, they also listed a further 15 Member States where there was an employers’
association, but no mandate to engage in collective bargaining (Voss et al, 2013). Interestingly, sectoral collective
bargaining is carried out in three out of the four countries with over 200,000 TAWs (Germany, France and the
Netherlands) – the fourth country, the UK, does not engage in sectoral collective bargaining. The absence of collective
bargaining and interest representation was also reported in the newer Member States. 
Replies from some countries where collective bargaining is prevalent suggest that social partners might regard the
policing of the agreement as sufficient to ensure that all employees are treated with dignity. The extent to which the
social partners act on their responsibility to address trafficking for labour exploitation varies according to factors such
as labour market conditions, the perceived extent of trafficking and labour exploitation, and the relationships between
the social partners and agency workers.
The most common activities are joint initiatives which build on already existing bargaining arrangements. In Denmark,
the Netherlands and Italy, the social partners jointly agreed on establishing systems for monitoring the application of
collective agreements (either in the TWA sector or agriculture) with the specific aim of identifying and eradicating
exploitative practices. A noteworthy example of conflicting practice comes from the Netherlands where the permit
system for temporary work agencies was abolished in 1998. This resulted, on the one hand, in the growth of TAWs with
collective agreements and certification. On the other hand, however, there was also a growth in TWAs of disputable
reputation. Those in favour of a permit system are of the opinion that the temporary agency work sector would have been
better regulated if the permit system had been kept in place. In Italy, the social partners agreed to establish a national
observatory to analyse, research and monitor trends and issues regarding migrant employment under the agriculture
agreement. 
According to the correspondents in Ireland, Romania and the UK, there is evidence of previous engagement of social
partners in the development and maintenance of regulations or campaigns aimed at reducing exploitation. Unfortunately,
© European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2016
34
in Ireland and the UK, some trends have been reversed, and the formal engagement – of unions at least – has ceased. In
Ireland, national social partnership broke down at the peak of the 2008 banking crisis. Under this umbrella, the Irish
Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) and The Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC) had negotiated with the
government in 2007 to initiate the Labour Relations Commission Code of Practice for Protecting Persons Employed
in other People’s Homes, which clarified existing rights and entitlements. Unions and the Migrants Rights Centre
Ireland (MRCI) have subsequently taken cases and developed important case law. However, since Ireland’s social
partnership has broken down, it is understood that there has been no national-level social partnerships on preventing
trafficking for labour exploitation, nor have there been any sectoral or local-level collective agreements on this issue. 
In Romania, unions, employers and government have signed a trilateral protocol to help reduce trafficking. The group
Salvați Copiii Romania has been working with the hospitality industry to raise awareness and run educational sessions
on child labour exploitation in the sector. In the UK, the structure of the Gangmasters Licensing Authority (GLA) has
been altered to remove the automatic representation of the various stakeholders.
There are also several examples of only one side of industry engaging in joint activities with government agencies and/or
NGOs. The European Commission has, over the years, provided funding for different projects (some involving trade
unions) to address trafficking for labour exploitation. 
For example, in Austria, a project coordinated by the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Human Rights focused on raising
awareness of trafficking for labour exploitation in the construction sector and within companies. In the Region of
Piedmont and the Province of Milan, Italian unions, NGOs, public administrations and the police have signed Protocols
of Understanding aimed at strengthening collaboration between these organisations to analyse, prevent, and combat
trafficking for labour exploitation and illegal intermediation. 
In Ireland, the MRCI has been involved in two alliances with trade unions. Since 2005, both the MRCI and the ICTU
have been engaged in a ‘Campaign to secure the rights of domestic workers’, resulting in a code of practice published
by the Labour Relations Commission. The second involves the MRCI cooperating with the largest trade union, the
Services, Industrial, Professional and Technical Union (SIPTU), to prevent exploitation of migrant workers in the
mushroom industry: this involved almost 1,300 such workers in some form of activity to oppose exploitation in 2010. A
registered employment agreement (REA) was established for mushroom workers, setting out terms and conditions, rates
of pay, holiday entitlements and sick pay. Mushroom workers were subsequently awarded hundreds of thousands of
euros in unpaid wages. REAs are collective agreements negotiated between employers and their organisations and trade
unions that cover issues such as minimum rates of pay and working conditions, and dispute procedures, applicable to a
sector or enterprise, which if registered as a multi-employer agreement by the Labour Court then become legally binding
not only upon the parties to these collective agreements, but upon all workers and employers in the affected sectors
(Eurofound, 2014).
The Norwegian Union of Municipal and General Employees is also involved, together with Norwegian People’s Aid in
running an office established for the purpose of giving advice and assistance to au pairs and to host families. Although
the au pair scheme is first and foremost supposed to be a cultural exchange, the au pairs also provide cheap labour for
their host families, and come to Norway through agencies or through private contacts on the internet. A report published
by the Trade and Labour Union (FOA) focuses on possible abuse and exploitation in that sector (789 KB PDF).
Denmark has a similar au pair scheme to Norway. 
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In some countries (for example, Slovenia and the Netherlands), there is cooperation between trade unions and labour
inspectorates in sectors where trafficking may be a problem. In others, there was collaboration between employers or
their organisations and NGOs. For example, in Bulgaria, employers are cooperating in La Strada International’s
‘NGO-Business engagement in addressing human trafficking’ project. This project was funded by the European
Commission’s ISEC programme and aims to address the issue of the demand and supply of products and services
involving the use of forced and trafficked labour. 
In the UK, a multi-stakeholder campaign (Stronger Together) to detect and combat forced and trafficked labour has
been organised in the food and agriculture industry. The Association of Labour Providers (ALP), Gangmasters Licensing
Authority (GLA) and Migrant All, together with sponsors and supporting partners (not including trade unions), provide
guidance, resources and a network for employers, labour providers, workers and their representatives to work together
to reduce exploitation. In Croatia, Latvia and Romania, the social partners are consulted on, and participate in, their
respective governments’ initiatives against trafficking – in Romania’s case, this is reported to be concentrated in the
hospitality, transport and construction sectors.
Other forms of social partner involvement are information or awareness-raising campaigns, such as that reported by the
German Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB) as part of the ‘Alliance Against Human Trafficking for Labour
Exploitation’, operating in four German states (Berlin, Brandenburg, North Rhine-Westphalia and Rhineland-Palatinate).
This is coordinated by the Work and Life Association (Arbeit und Leben e.V.) in Berlin and supported by the
International Labour Organization (ILO) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). The Finnish
Metalworkers’ Union, Trade Union Pro and the Central Organisation of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK) took part in an
information campaign on human trafficking in 2012. This was coordinated by the national rapporteur on trafficking in
human beings (Ombudsman for Minorities) and by the IOM. 
The example from the Czech Republic illustrates how dialogue, joint initiatives and campaigns by the government,
social partners and NGOs can result in an integrated approach based on tripartite cooperation. The Czech Republic
adopted regulations and policies which were developed in cooperation with the social partners and NGOs. To ensure
effective monitoring, regular training of personnel from relevant public authorities is provided and the number of labour
inspections has increased. Social partners adopted general and company-level agreements, while employers are also
considering developing a blacklist of non-compliant labour market intermediaries to raise awareness and fight unfair
competition (see Box 2). 
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Box 2: Tripartite good practice example – the Czech Republic
The Czech Republic is a good example of successful engagement in a tripartite approach to regulating labour market
intermediaries and preventing trafficking for labour exploitation. It has a relatively large number of labour market
intermediaries (around 1,500) and in 2000 ratified ILO Convention 181 – which required the establishment of a system
of licensing and monitoring compliance with rules and regulations. Bound by Convention 181, but also by the TAW
Directive and the Anti-Trafficking Directive, a licensing system was established in accordance with Article 60,
Employment Act No. 435 of 2004. 
Government policy
A coordinated approach by the institutions led to the formulation and adoption of the National strategy for combating
trafficking in human beings in the Czech Republic in 2012–2015. Moreover, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
(MoLSA) administrates a project called, ‘Innovations aimed at preventing labour exploitation of EU citizens’. The
objective is to develop a policy and targeted campaign focusing on the prevention of labour exploitation of Bulgarian
citizens in the Czech Republic. In this project, MoLSA cooperates with both Czech and Bulgarian civil society
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organisations. In the future, attention will be focused on crimes of trafficking in human beings committed by means of
new information technologies, such as social media. 
A working group concentrating on labour market intermediaries was established in the Czech Republic in 2008 and
continues to meet today. This includes representatives of trade unions, employers, temporary work agencies’
associations, MoLSA, the Labour Inspection Office and the Ministry of the Interior. An interdepartmental group to
combat trafficking in human beings was set up in the same year (in Czech). Special training has also been given
to inspectors from the State Labour Inspection office (SUP) on the employment of foreign nationals, and two trained
inspectors are located in each regional labour inspection office. The focus has been on detecting people illegally
working in the Czech Republic, and recent attention has been directed to temporary work agencies and their clients.
Detection can result in the withdrawal of labour market intermediaries’ operating licences. The number of inspections
generally has been increased as well. Trafficking in human beings as a topic is also included in the police training.
Targeted training of judges and prosecutors, consular officials, employees of the Administration of Refugee Facilities
(SUZ) is also delivered. 
Social partners’ activity
The social partners share the same objective: to combat illegal employment and labour exploitation. This is underlined
by the president of Association of Personnel Service Providers (APPS): ‘Our main goal is to remove such agencies from
the market that exploit people, foreign nationals, in particular’. The president of ČMKOS, a trade union, adds that, ‘We
are not particularly enthusiastic about agency employment, but we do not condemn it generally either. What we do
condemn are the practices of many agencies that, undisturbed and often arrogantly ignored by company owners,
practice slavery of modern times and get agency employees into insoluable situations.’ 
A first step was made in March 2014, when the APPS signed a special cooperation agreement with metalworking union
KOVO. It aims to enforce decent working conditions and to combat illegal forms of employment. The parties to the
agreement see this as combating the ‘black market’ efficiently. Unlike most previous agreements, this sectoral
agreement does not deal with pay, but is more closely related to exploitation. 
The first company-level agreement in the TWA sector which relates to ‘dignified working conditions’ followed by an
agreement regarding the use of agency workers, was concluded at Skoda. While the motor industry is not ordinarily
associated with trafficking for labour exploitation, both sides in the agreement see it as a start in undermining illicit
agencies and undeclared work.
The Czech Republic’s LMI association APPS, together with the Confederation of Industry of the Czech Republic
(SPČR) are considering the introduction of a ‘blacklist’ of temporary work agencies which do not comply with
regulatory requirements. This list will be based on practical findings from employers (users) and the APPS.
The blacklist should be an instrument for cleaning the agency employment market, as well as increasing trust in those
which operate legitimately. 
Source: Eurofound’s network of European correspondents – Czech Republic correspondent, 2014
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Actions by employee organisations
Some trade unions have established systems for handling complaints (particularly from migrant workers) and/or for
monitoring abusive behaviour of employers in high-risk sectors. This was reported in Slovenia by the Association of Free
Trade Unions (ZSSS), in Cyprus by the Pancyprian Federation of Labour (PEO) and in Italy by the Italian Confederation
of Trade Unions (CISL). In the Netherlands, affiliates of the Dutch Federation of Trade Unions (FNV) have established
complaint desks to report on illegal practices. These may relate to breaches of collective agreements and other illicit
activities, as well as allegations of trafficking.
In other countries, trade unions have launched information campaigns. In Denmark, the United Federation of Danish
Workers (3F) published a series of articles on human trafficking in the cleaning sector in its newsletter, winning an award
from the NGO Hope Now. Both of the main Spanish trade unions have also conducted information campaigns on
trafficking in human beings. During 2010, the General Workers’ Union (UGT) launched a national campaign on
trafficking, and in February 2013 held a one-day seminar calling for zero tolerance for trafficking for the purpose of
labour exploitation – with a particular gender perspective. In April 2014, the regional Trade Union Confederation of
Workers’ Commissions (CCOO) in Castilla-La Mancha, launched a service to assist with complaints made by workers
undergoing labour exploitation. In the UK, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) published an online educational guide,
Migration: the fight against exploitation, while Finland’s service sector trade union Service Union United (PAM)
provided training for its shop stewards in how to detect signs of trafficking at workplaces.
In Sweden, where berry-picking in northern Swedish forests has been associated with exploitation of migrant workers
from Asia, as well as from Bulgaria and Romania, the trade union Kommunal sent out a questionnaire to wholesalers of
berries. The questionnaire included questions on ethical considerations when buying and selling berries, as well as on
how the wholesalers check that the product has been acquired legally and according to collectively agreed terms.
According to the union, many wholesalers responded very well to this initiative in 2014 and have since reviewed their
procedures.
There are also examples of trans-national cooperation. The Bulgarian trade union confederation Podkrepa’s principal
activity against trafficking has been to assist mobile Bulgarian workers by establishing links with trade unions in host
countries. The signing of a bilateral agreement with unions in Germany, led to the establishment of the BeGIN project
providing information and training on labour and social security rights for Bulgarian workers employed in Germany.
Similarly, the Hungarian LIGA confederation is participating in a joint project with the British TUC and Romanian
Cartel Alfa to assess the needs of mobile workers. 
Actions by employer organisations and companies
CIETT states that it, and its members, have engaged in a series of international and European initiatives to combat rogue
operators that pass themselves off as ‘agencies’ in order to take advantage of workers. A couple of examples support this
statement:
n The ILO Fair Recruitment Initiative is a multi-stakeholder initiative supporting Convention No. 181, among
others, that aims to prevent human trafficking and forced labour and to promote fair recruitment practices. 
n The International Organisation for Migration’s (IOM) International Recruitment Integrity System promotes ethical
cross-border recruitment by certifying responsible and professional agencies.
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CIETT has also participated recently in the following initiatives:
n the European Commission guidance on the implementation of the UN business and human rights for employment
and recruitment agencies;
n the Dhaka Principles;
n the Athens Ethical Principles against human trafficking.
Employers’ activities at national level are focused on developing codes of conduct. The Finnish Employment Agencies
Association (HPL) adopted rules for the recruitment of foreign employees which include minimum requirements for
training, appropriate accommodation, and a ban on workers being charged fees. Contracts and applicable agreements are
to be provided in the workers’ language, and it was recommended that workers should not be employed through
third-parties or subcontractors. The Dutch Federation of Agricultural and Horticultural Organisations (LTO) also has a
code of conduct for its members and has been cooperating with the public employment service to fill vacancies since the
early 2000s. 
Some employers also provide information and educational material. The Polish-based agency Aterima, which operates
in the health and social sector, hosts a website jointly with the NGO Po-moc called ‘Safe trip abroad’. The contents
include a film, guide book and quiz to encourage safe behaviour while travelling, with the overall aim of preventing
human trafficking.
Engagement in public and policy debates 
According to the information provided by the national correspondents, the social partners often recognise the limits of
their ability to combat trafficking, focusing their efforts on ensuring that the government enacts adequate regulation and
enforces it effectively. In the main, the debate on this issue is a general one about trafficking for labour exploitation.
However, some proposals may occasionally be targeted at particular economic sectors or groups of workers and this
might be expected to have a specific impact on labour market intermediaries. Some parties approach the issue as being
related to regulation of workplaces, others as a migration problem (sometimes using the term ‘social dumping’). 
All the Austrian social partners, through their involvement in the working group on trafficking set up by the Federal
Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection ‘BMASK’, are engaged in combating all forms of labour
exploitation. The Austrian Trade Union Federation (ÖGB) emphasises the rights of workers and the protection of local
wage and social security standards, which is also important to employers who are interested in fair competition in the
Austrian market. This engagement has resulted in the Act Against Wage and Social Dumping (Lohn- und
Sozialdumpingbekämpfungsgesetz). This law imposes fines for failure to pay wages in compliance with collective
agreements and, in the event of repeat offending, can result in foreign enterprises being banned from trading in Austria,
or an Austrian enterprise having its trading licence revoked for a year. The legislation does not specifically deal with
trafficking, and negotiations are under way regarding stricter regulations on the availability of pay documents. 
In Cyprus, the Pancyprian Federation of Labour (PEO), has called for increased inspections by the Department of
Industrial Relations and by the police to identify instances of trafficking in human beings and labour exploitation. In the
Czech Republic, the social partners (including representatives of temporary work agencies) have welcomed the State’s
recent increase in inspection activities, focusing on illegal employment. Both trade unions and the Association of
Personnel Service Providers (APPS) would like to improve the state inspection mechanisms, primarily at the point of
granting licences for employment intermediation. Calls for improved inspection and enforcement mechanisms have also
come from unions in Finland, Slovenia and Spain. In the latter case, the unions (and the Labour Inspectorate) also called
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for the Ministry of Economic Development and Technology to change the Companies Act, so that employers who have
flouted rules on pay will not be able to establish new companies. 
In Finland, the regulation of workplaces to prevent abuses has attracted considerable attention. The Central Organisation
of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK) has called for greater supervision – in accordance with the Employers Sanction Directive
– of companies employing migrant workers. SAK also proposed that unions be given the right to bring cases related to
breaches of working conditions to court on behalf of individuals. It is thought that this could prove beneficial in
combating trafficking, since victims are usually reluctant to report crimes to which they have been subjected. The
Finnish Employment Agencies Association (HPL) and Service Union United (PAM) agree that the worst abuses occur
in smaller, unorganised enterprises – a view shared by employers and unions in the Italian agency sector. On this basis,
PAM calls for greater access to such companies, together with enhanced health and safety inspections, and the
enforcement of contractor liability. The Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK), however, opposes the right of trade
unions to bring cases to the attention of a court: according to EK, it should be an individual decision and not a trade
union decision to go to court. 
In its 2013–2017 action plan, the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions’ (LO) has proposed tackling labour
trafficking. LO asks for better coordination between public authorities in different government ministries, including the
reorganisation of projects and/or coordinated inspections, and improved operational collaboration. In its view, such
public units should share analytical and intelligence work more effectively. The Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise
(NHO) made an official statement regarding human trafficking in September 2010 when putting forward 10 suggestions
on how to combat labour market crimes. They also proposed the better coordination of public authorities and of specific
programmes directed at different industries, as well as increased maximum sentences and improved regulations and
enforcement to avoid recurrent bankruptcies.
Differences have also emerged between the Swedish union Kommunal and the employers’ organisation Svenskt
Näringsliv over perceived abuses in non-Swedish labour market intermediaries operating in the country. Where the union
argues for more effective application of controls and liabilities, the employers claim that the tax rules need to be changed
to cut down on the use of foreign TWAs and EPAs.
Spanish trade unions, together with public authorities, employers and other institutions, called for the approval of a ‘Plan
against trafficking in human beings for labour purposes’, which was not implemented until recently. The General
Workers’ Union (UGT) has criticised the lack of a coordinated database centralising statistics on the issue. Moreover,
the General Budget Law for 2015 does not allocate a specific amount for fighting trafficking in human beings. Italian
unions also see the implementation of an anti-trafficking plan that features measures to combat labour exploitation as a
priority, with the Italian Confederation of Trade Unions (CISL) stating that a ‘culture of legality’ needs to be promoted,
as well as the strengthening of cooperation with authorities in the countries of origin. An earlier campaign by the Italian
General Confederation of Labour (CGIL) led to a new Section to the Criminal Code (S603) being introduced in 2011 to
punish unlawful gangmastering in agriculture and construction.
Unions in Romania have expressed concern over the failure of anti-trafficking measures to address labour market failures
related to labour market intermediaries acting improperly regarding workers’ rights. A proposal was made in 2012 by the
then coalition government to introduce a ‘social judicial record’ for private companies wishing to bid for public
contracts, aimed particularly at labour market intermediaries in construction, transport and agriculture. It seems that no
further steps to implement this have yet been taken. 
In summary, it appears that despite their activities, social partners have not taken a very prominent stance in opposing
trafficking – possibly reflecting a view that dealing with criminal offences is principally the responsibility of the state.
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Another reason might be the fact that their resources are limited. They have publicly opposed trafficking for labour
exploitation in a number of countries (see Box 1 on p. 31). However, they may face problems with public attitudes, or
even those of their own members. The Greek response drew attention to the infamous ‘Manolada case’: the acquittal in
2014 of farmers who had shot 28 Bangladeshi workers (1.46MB PDF) who had been demanding back pay. This
highlights the fact that ‘the institutional framework for the renewal of immigrants’ residence permits forces hundreds of
thousands of farm workers into illegality, making it easier for migrant trafficking networks to operate and forced labour
to exist’. Polish employers’ organisation Konfederacja Lewiatan also felt that more educational work was needed to
overcome members’ doubts about the extent of forced labour. This could go some way to explaining the absence of joint
activities between social partners on this matter in Poland.
The Belgian response drew attention to the divergent interests of the two sides; the trade unions expressing concern that
labour and social security rights were at stake, while employers rejected further undesirable competitive pressure on
honest businesses. At their congress in 2014, the General Federation of Belgian Labour (ABVV/FGTB) went further’
proposing a motion on undocumented migrants and victims of trafficking, stating that it was ‘on their side and supports
their struggle’.
Use of the media was seen as vital by Bulgarian trade unions because of difficulties in reaching workers likely to be
affected, since these workers are mostly part of the informal economy or are members of particularly vulnerable groups
(such as children). In other cases, it was clear that the unions were using the term ‘modern slavery’ in the media in order
to attract attention about labour market abuses. This term was, for example, used in a newspaper article in Luxembourg
about the low wages and poor accommodation given to agency construction workers across the border in France who
had been mainly recruited in Africa (Luxemburger Wort, 2013). While these conditions were clearly in breach of the
spirit of posting regulations and collective agreements, it was not evident that deception (or force) had been used against
the workers. 
Farm employers in Greece have argued in the media that tight controls over the renewal of seasonal work permits has
led to the greater exploitation of migrants, enabling trafficking networks. Under the Seasonal Workers Directive, third-
country nationals are allowed to stay for 90 days if they have a valid work contract, insurance coverage and
accommodation. As their stay is linked to their employment, there is an increased risk of exploitation and, potentially,
trafficking, if workers wish to stay longer. This might be one reason why employers in the agricultural sector in Greece
are calling for legal access to migrant labour. 
Cases of good practice by public authorities
In the present study, correspondents were asked to identify what they saw as examples of good practice, relating to
combating trafficking for labour exploitation in labour market intermediaries. Little was identified which specifically
referred to the intermediaries, or indeed employers. Much of what was cited was either targeted at ‘victims’ or was
devoted to awareness-raising. The response from Hungary, for example, cited an information campaign held at a youth
music festival, aimed at letting young potential workers know what rights they have when choosing to work elsewhere
in Europe. 
However, there were some examples of anti-trafficking initiatives which could be expected to have particular impact in
reducing or detecting trafficking amongst labour market intermediaries. Such examples of emerging good practice are
described below.
One such example was cited in several responses, and in other literature. This was described as the ‘flagship project’ of
the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, known as ADSTRINGO (‘Addressing trafficking in human
beings for labour exploitation through improved partnerships, enhanced diagnostics and intensified organisational
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approaches’). It is a collaboration between Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway,
and Sweden, and has included international meetings and coordination, joint research on recruitment practices, plus the
creation of guidelines for states, businesses, trade unions and civil society. Some of the material produced for this
project has been mentioned in this report, and it is clear that it has been a significant advance in developing international
collaboration.
Collaboration between Swedish public authorities (the police, Migration Board, Tax Agency and Work Environment
Authority), began in 2011 and led to the publication of guidelines aimed at companies offering employment to migrant
berry pickers, with the intention of reducing exploitation of migrants. At the other end of the migrant journey, the
Bulgarian National Employment Agency, together with their anti-trafficking committee, organised information
campaigns via the media to help prevent exploitation of Bulgarian labour used for picking blueberries in Sweden. 
Particular activities of labour inspectors were highlighted in two reports. In the Czech Republic, special training has been
given to inspectors on the employment of foreign nationals located in each of the two district offices. The focus has been
on detecting people illegally working in the Czech Republic, and recent attention has been directed to temporary work
agencies and their clients. Detection can result in the withdrawal of licences to operate labour market intermediaries. In
Italy, a training programme and subsequent handbook on labour exploitation and human trafficking (in Italian,
710KB PDF) was developed for labour inspectors in 2012. A handbook was also drafted in 2010 for Italian and
Romanian Labour Inspectorates, envisaging cooperation on monitoring posted workers. 
Guidance for people or enterprises using labour market intermediaries has been issued by the State Employment Agency
in Latvia. It states that a person or enterprise should verify that the LMI is licensed and to check that employment
conditions are appropriate. The guidance also clarifies the information that should be provided to a jobseeker before
starting (such as the identity of employer, what the worker’s duties will be, and their workplace).
Somewhat more robust measures are reported in the Netherlands, where ‘chain liability’ for offences committed by
labour market intermediaries operating along the supply chain of labour has been established. At the same time,
cooperation between the various arms of enforcement (labour and tax inspection, police and judiciary) has been
strengthened in order to better detect such infringements. In a similar vein, the UK’s Gangmasters Licensing Authority
(GLA) has always shared intelligence with other enforcement bodies such as tax authorities and immigration control.
The GLA is now also taking part in joint operations specifically targeting trafficking which involve the police and the
UK Human Trafficking Centre.
The role of social dialogue has been recognised in several countries when it comes to regulating (as in the Netherlands,
for example), derogating (UK, for example) and setting terms for the use of agency workers. Pugliano and Doerflinger
(2013) found that ‘local unions and works councils may influence the norms of treatment and the working conditions of
agency workers via plant-level negotiations with HR managers’. This is interesting, as they examined manufacturing
plants in the automotive sector which are not ordinarily associated with labour exploitation. However, there may be some
divergence of interests. The key interest of employer organisations is in ensuring that there is a legal framework for
operating, and that trade unions focus on the reduction of the potential for undercutting employment terms and
conditions of the permanent workforce. 
Social dialogue, where it occurs at enterprise level, is likely to be taking place in organisations least likely to be engaging
in the most exploitative practices (and therefore less likely to engage in trafficking for purposes of labour exploitation
as defined in ILO/EU instruments). 
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Furthermore, there must be some questions as to whether voluntary regulation can deal with this issue, particularly in
light of the EU-wide recognition that employers have to be liable to penalties if engaging in trafficking for labour
exploitation. Indeed, it is of note that the UK GLA, which is widely cited as an example of good practice, came into
existence only after the Temporary Labour Working Group (which included unions and employer organisations) had
concluded that voluntary regulation in the sector could not combat exploitative practices in labour market intermediaries
operating in the UK food sector.
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The report set out to examine two phenomena that are not easy to measure. Trafficking for labour exploitation is a serious
crime, but it is not the only form of exploitation. Other types of exploitative practices, which would constitute labour
law violations rather than criminal activities, can also be observed within the EU labour market. At the same time, while
labour market intermediation is now regarded by regulators as being a positive element of labour market efficiency, at
its fringes, one can see clear examples of criminal activity.
The details contained in the national responses correspond with much of the research published elsewhere. While not all
labour market intermediaries are exploitative, it is evident that some are operating outside legal and/or formal
parameters. It would therefore be prudent to consider how their operations might be better regulated and monitored as
part of the strategy being developed to combat trafficking for labour exploitation. The report places emphasis on the issue
of trafficking for the purpose of labour exploitation and its approach is two-fold. On the one hand, it analyses information
provided by an expert from each Member State on the national legislation and measures regarding the operation of labour
market intermediaries and in relation to trafficking. On the other hand, it explores the approach taken by social partners
in each Member State and occasionally by social partners from different Member States that work in collaboration. This
approach has allowed for good practice to be identified. 
Unsurprisingly, social partners – where they have expressed their view – are opposed to trafficking. However, as
trafficking is more likely to occur at European or international level, this could explain the higher priority given to anti-
trafficking measures in international policymaking than at national level. Social partner activity is complementary to
state regulation. Employers’ associations tend not to cover all operators and, even where collective agreements are
generally applicable, enforcement will prove challenging, particularly when it comes to small and medium-sized labour
market intermediaries. Furthermore, it is not clear what sanctions are available to employers’ organisations, apart from
expelling employers from their associations.
Unions too are confronted with problems in attempting to represent or assist groups of workers who are likely to be
hidden away or isolated, who might be working in undeclared work, or who may be undocumented migrants – or both.
They also face, in some cases, difficulties in taking up cases and enforcing judgements. In some jurisdictions, cases are
taken by individuals (albeit assisted by unions): the individual has to launch any enforcement actions and the union is
not formally party to the proceedings.
For employers’ and workers’ organisations, trafficking for labour exploitation is unlikely to be a top priority. For
membership organisations, the resources that can be devoted to combating trafficking are likely to be small. 
While acknowledging the issues social partners may face when engaging in preventative measures on trafficking, there
are still enough examples in this report to show that social partners can – and do – take part in activities directed against
trafficking, and against exploitative practices in labour market intermediaries. More could be done to address both issues
together, but this is a small step, particularly where there is a functioning sectoral social dialogue. In particular, there is
a joint concern to avoid unfair competition leading to downward pressure on pay and conditions, or to job losses.
Adopting policy is one thing: putting it into practice through the implementation of existing regulations, however, is
another. Detailed regulation does not necessarily lead to effective enforcement. For example, the French response cited
a report regarding Portuguese construction workers who were posted to work in France, but were paid the Portuguese
minimum wage rather than the collectively agreed minimum wage in France. While this may not constitute forced
labour, it could be cosidered to be exploitative – and unlawful. This situation continued (according to daily newspaper
L’Humanité) for two years without being detected. 
The Council of Europe’s experts on trafficking pointed to the need for intensified labour inspections, particularly in sectors
Conclusions
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most at risk (GRETA, 2014). They identified agriculture, construction, textiles, the hotel/catering sector and domestic
work, which match the data collected for this report. Not all labour inspectorates have the mandate to address trafficking
in human beings because their role might be restricted to health and safety checks. The absence of such inspectors is likely
to hinder the detection of exploitation in general, and trafficking in particular. Member States should consider establishing
a labour inspectorate, or strengthening those already in existence – and providing training on detecting and responding to
trafficking for labour exploitation. There are also other officials who might need training to identify possible cases of
trafficking for labour exploitation, in order to maximise the chances of detection. These might include health and safety
and hygiene inspectors, housing officials, police, immigration officers and tax/social security inspectors. 
At the same time as seeking to better identify possible trafficking, regulation is needed to reduce the extent to which
exploitative labour market intermediaries can operate. ILO Convention 181 requires the establishment of licensing or
registration schemes for labour market intermediaries, and this report has shown that many countries have done this – also
in some cases where they have not ratified the convention. However, regulating formal labour market intermediaries is of
limited value if the proliferation of informal actors is neither restricted nor penalised. The same will apply to codes of
practice (favoured by employer associations) and collective agreements (favoured by trade unions) if flouting them does
not lead to any consequences. Where non-legally binding codes exist, there will obviously be no legal consequences.
However, commercial sensitivities have been found to be a powerful motivating factor: given that bad publicity tends to
be avoided by key clients, robust and transparent enforcement mechanisms – even where they are submitted to voluntarily
– may work in motivating labour market intermediaries to comply. Taken together this suggests that the best option is for
a licensing scheme that covers both temporary work agencies (TWAs) and employment placement agencies (EPAs), and
is subject to strict enforcement. Factors for consideration in such a scheme should include the suitability of proprietors or
senior executives, financial guarantees for wages and social security contributions, and periodic inspections and
re-licensing. Governments who are responsible for monitoring the enforcement of licensing (and other) schemes play a
role in holding businesses accountable if they do not comply with national regulations. According to the Anti-Trafficking
Directive, Articles 5 and 6, such licences can be revoked or a business shut down if it is found that it engaged in trafficking
for labour exploitation. The implementation and monitoring of the licensing scheme should be supplemented by sectoral
social dialogue and/or codes of practice for labour market intermediaries. To this end, governments can play a key role by
encouraging collective representation and bargaining.
This liability must include penalties for use of irregular operators, even where no abuse of workers has been
demonstrated. This would help reduce the presence of informal or even criminal operators, and of course requires there
to be some system for identifying those operating legitimately – such as a licensing system. Not all Member States have
such systems, and those which exist differ quite markedly. It has been accepted that Member States can require operators
based in other Member States to have a legal presence and meet all the licensing requirements that would apply to
nationally based enterprises. While this can work for TWAs, it is not so easily applied to EPAs. It has been seen how the
charging of fees in countries of origin can result in debt bondage, and how workers may be deceived by recruiters as to
the nature of the proposed jobs. Again, it may be that placing liability on the end-using enterprises for the activities of
recruiting agents might make them more selective about their use of EPAs.
Labour exploitation is not solely an accompaniment of migration. A key question for legislative systems must be the
extent to which those exposed to exploitative practices feel confident that complaints they might make will lead to
receiving restitution and being granted lawful access to the formal labour market, and to their exploiters being punished.
Those who might feel at risk of deportation may prefer to avoid officialdom rather than complain. In such a situation, it
is the Member States’ responsibility under Article 11 and 12 of the Anti-Trafficking Directive to assist, support and
protect those who were trafficked and exploited. Measures to be offered to these people include, for instance, the
provision of legal counselling and legal representation. 
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The purpose of this report was to explore the role and practice of labour market intermediaries in trafficking for labour
exploitation, to discuss the complex and varied systems of regulation that exists in different Member States, to explain
the role and activities of social partners in tackling trafficking for labour and to consider good practice examples. This
information will feed into a guide for public authorities to more effectively prevent and tackle trafficking for labour
exploitation through labour market intermediaries.
In terms of national definitions, in addition to the two main EU directives (on human trafficking and on temporary
agency work) most Member States have adopted parts of the ILO conventions. Questionnaire responses have shown that
definitions are often general, highlighting the need to specify definitions. Clear and precise definitions can contribute to
effective enforcement and targeted policy intervention. More concise definitions could also add to the improved
collection and reliability of data in relation to the significance and incidence of labour market intermediaries and
trafficking for labour exploitation. Successful prosecution is rare as it is difficult to prove fraudulent practices, especially
when the law only provides general definitions of concepts and related practices.  
On the issue of regulating labour market intermediaries, the report has shown that the regulatory systems across different
Member States are complex and were developed within the context of different market environments as seen in Table 2
(p. 21). Therefore, in environments where there is increased liberalisation, regulation for labour market intermediaries
is minimal. In other cases, where there is a balance between legislation and collective agreements, regulation varies. 
In terms of registration and licensing, the systems which require specific qualifications for proprietors/legal
representatives and impose bans from operating in the event of abuse will, if (and only if) adequately enforced, help to
keep the number of labour market intermediaries engaged in fraudulent practices to a minimum. If public and business
support is to be secured, a system of approved contractors and a ‘kite mark’ of end users committed to using only
approved contractors might prove useful. Based on the Public Procurement Directive, (2004/18/EC) Article 57,
businesses who engaged in trafficking for labour exploitation should be excluded from such a system. 
The activities of labour market intermediaries require little fixed capital, and much of the abuse appears to take place in
cross-border activities. It follows that there is a need for greater cross-border cooperation (and not only in traditional
cross-border areas) of public authorities, as well as social partners. 
Designing effective regulatory systems requires much better information on the nature and location of labour
exploitation than currently available. Reported malpractice by agencies should be analysed and assessed at local and
national level. An EU-wide comparative analysis would be desirable but seems difficult to conduct at present. According
to the Anti-Trafficking Directive, further commitment and efforts by the EU and its Member States are required to
combat trafficking with better enforcement and sanctions for labour market intermediaries that break the law. These
relate in particular to the coordination and coherence of efforts between the EU, Member States and other international
organisations. 
On the issue of social partner activity, it appears that where there is sectoral collective bargaining (for TWAs at least),
there is likely to be some commitment on the part of the social partners to monitor adherence. This is also likely to mean
that there is more detailed knowledge of malpractice by labour market intermediaries. The consequence of paying greater
attention to labour abuses is that they are more likely to be enumerated and for issues to become more apparent.
Towards a good practice guide 
for public authorities
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Another argument for the promotion of social partner activity, especially in the TWA sector, was identified by the
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in their 2014 report on ensuring that businesses do not
contribute to trafficking in human beings. They pointed out that workers subjected to coercion or exploitation of their
vulnerability might be unable to form or join a union. If supported by a stronger national trade union they may be
successful. This highlights the importance of established trade unions in empowering workers to organise and to form a
collective voice.  
This might also be done by formally encouraging the extension of collective bargaining and representation, but also by
reducing some of the vulnerability which arises from having precarious immigration status. The vigilance of social
partners is likely to be enhanced by the existence of a robust system of licensing, where the partners can be sure that the
detection of offences is likely to result in the removal of operators engaging in fraudulent practices.
Many of the responses included details of awareness-raising activities aimed at the general public, young people in
particular. For this to be effective it would need to take place before any money or contracts have changed hands. And
as Gordon commented in her 2015 report for the ILO, information on rights needs to be: 
provided to workers who will have the power, the protection from retaliation, and the institutional support necessary
to actually exercise the rights about which they learn.
(Gordon, 2015)
She goes on to point out that, in most contexts, this is not the case. However, the case for training inspectors and law
enforcement officers is inescapable. The better equipped they are to identify trafficking, the more readily they will be
able to take appropriate action. The promotion of regular training for officials including front-line police officers is a
requirement under Article 18 of the Anti-Trafficking Directive, which must be implemented by Member States.
This, however, requires the establishment of inspectorates with sufficient resources to monitor the labour market
effectively – particularly the sectors which are emerging as having higher risk. This must include labour market
intermediaries operating in agriculture, construction, cleaning, hospitality, and domestic work. 
Enforcement and control is also most likely to be effective where the end users of labour market intermediaries are held
accountable for breaches, as well as the intermediaries themselves. This not only encourages vigilance in terms of the
service supply chain, but also ensures that wages, taxes and social security contributions are paid.
Within this context, Table 7 (p. 47) provides a summary of good practice examples as identified and reported across
Member States.
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Table 7: Overview of good practice
Source: Eurofound’s network of European correspondents, 2014
Table 7 shows that effort has been made in raising awareness about trafficking and victims of trafficking, both by
government agencies and social partners, which may indicate the need for a better discussion and better understanding
of the issues involved. The table also highlights a human rights approach to trafficking, as governments and social
partners make provisions for the victims. There is a debate about whether the current provisions for victims are adequate.
However, according to Article 11 of the Anti-Trafficking Directive, Member States are obliged to provide assistance to
victims. Overall, greater effort needs to be made to improve regional, cross-border and tripartite cooperation, and joint
activities dealing with both labour market intermediaries and recruitment practices, and trafficking for labour
exploitation.
The above good practice examples and the following suggestions could help to develop a guide for best practice to be
used by public authorities.
There are several policy pointers to consider when developing such a guide:
n Develop clear national definitions of labour market intermediaries, trafficking and labour exploitation based on
relevant European directives and international instruments.
n Based on concise definitions, improve the collection of data on the significance and incidence of labour market
intermediaries and trafficking for labour exploitation.
n Increase the coverage of labour market intermediaries who are registered, licensed and/or certified.
n Based on improved registration, licensing and/or certification comprehensively enforce and sanction labour market
intermediaries who might be engaged at the entry point of trafficking.
n Increase regional and cross-border cooperation among public authorities and social partners. 
n Support coherent and effective bipartite and tripartite joint activities dealing with both subjects: labour market
intermediaries and recruitment practices, and trafficking for labour exploitation.
n Support social partners in empowering vulnerable workers to organise, especially in small and medium-sized labour
market intermediaries. 
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Good Practice Member State
National government activities
Cross-border cooperation AT, BG, IT, RO, SE
Labour Inspectorate activity CZ, LN, SI, IT, RO
Introducing legislation and further regulation NL, AT, BE, ES, PT
Cooperation between different authorities NL, DK, CY, FR, LV 
Guidance (raising awareness, training, ethical code) NL, UK, RO, DK, BG, CY, CZ, ES, FR, HR, HU, IT, LT, MT, PL, SI
Provision of support for victims NO, BE, BG, CZ, PT, SI, SK
Cooperation with social partners RO, DE, DK, AT, BG, CZ, HR, PT, SK
Social partners
Provision of support to victims DE
Cooperation between trade unions and labour inspectorate NL, SI
Guidance (raising awareness, training, ethical code) UK, IE, DK, AT, BG, FI, IT, LV, SE, SI 
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Questions Notes
National definitions. Please provide, where they exist, definitions of the following key terms:
Labour market intermediary (LMI)
Temporary work agency (TWA)
Employment placement agency (EPA)
Other forms of LMI
Trafficking for labour exploitation 
Forced labour
Please identify the legislation or regulation where the
definitions can be found.
‘Other forms of LMI’ might include contract brokers,
those supplying independent workers on temporary
basis, websites, staff lending arrangements.
Statistics. Please provide data for the last three available years for the following:
Trafficking cases (if possible disaggregated by sex) for the purposes of labour exploitation
and domestic servitude
Other forms of labour exploitation not specifically identified as trafficking
Trafficking as defined by national administrations/
enforcement bodies. 
‘Other forms of labour exploitation’ might include
exploitation or conditions contrary to human dignity,
for example.
Legislation. Please provide details of the following legal provisions:
Registration or licensing systems for LMIs. Please give separate details for TWAs, EPAs
and other LMIs where they exist. What conditions must be met? Are there regulations on
liability for wages and social security?
Are there any special provisions for cross-border recruitment or posting? If so please
identify them.
Are there any special legislation or rules, regulations or procedures specifically aimed at
preventing trafficking in human beings activities which apply to LMIs? 
Are there any other forms of relevant regulation (including non-binding, voluntary or self-
regulation) within the LMI sector? Please give details. 
What specific legal measures exist for combatting trafficking, forced labour, or labour
exploitation? How are cases detected and measures enforced?
Where there are specific provisions for certain
sectors (social care, construction, agriculture, for
example), please identify them.
Include details of monitoring and enforcement, and
where relevant show provisions for TWA and EPA
separately.
Please include measures related to the
ratification/transposition of international instruments
and EU directives: e.g. on temporary work, removal
of third-country nationals, trafficking, posting of
workers, ILO Private Employment Agencies
Convention 1997 (No. 181) and Forced Labour
Convention 1930 (No 29).
Social partner actions. Please give details of any actions undertaken by social partners to combat trafficking for labour exploitation
in LMIs.
Collective Agreements 
Codes of practice or practices specifically aimed at preventing trafficking for labour
exploitation.
Other social partner activities
We are most interested in measures at the sectoral
or enterprise level, but where there are none,
national level agreements which cover all
enterprises are also of interest.
Please identify any NGOs having a specific role in combatting trafficking for labour exploitation, or supporting workers affected.
Good practice. Please give examples of good practice in the combat of trafficking for
labour exploitation in LMIs
Good practice could take the form of codes of
conduct, reporting and monitoring, training, or
awareness-raising; practice of labour inspectors,
licensing systems or enforcing liability. What
constitutes ‘good practice’ should be based on
national correspondents’ perception and judgement.
Research. Please identify any significant studies published since 2010 relating to
trafficking for labour exploitation (other than official statistics elsewhere mentioned).
These may be academic studies or those produced by NGOs or regulatory bodies. Any
citing case studies of good practice are of particular interest.
Views of social partners. Please give details of the views of the social partners on
trafficking for labour exploitation.
These may be national or sectoral partners, but where
they exist those covering LMIs would be preferred.
Public discussion. Has there been any recent political or media discussion of trafficking
in general, and specifically relating to LMIs? Please give details.
In the past three years.
Comments from national correspondents. Do you have any further comments of
relevance to the theme of this study?
Please limit these to 500 words maximum.
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The right to free movement for workers within the European
Union was enshrined in Article 48 of the EEC Treaty in 1957.
Nowadays, private labour market intermediaries – such as
temporary work agencies and employment placement agencies –
contribute to facilitating this labour mobility in their role as
mediator between individual workers and organisations in need of
labour. However, due to loopholes in regulation, some workers and
vulnerable groups run the risk of being exploited by fraudulent
agencies. This report examines how public authorities are
currently regulating labour market intermediaries across Member
States, highlighting the effectiveness or otherwise of different
registration or licensing schemes. It also examines activities by
social partners aimed at preventing the trafficking of labour. The
overall aim is to contribute to the development of a best practice
guide for public authorities to encourage  better monitoring and
enforcement of regulations deterring trafficking for the purpose of
labour exploitation. 
The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working
Conditions (Eurofound) is a tripartite European Union Agency, whose role is
to provide knowledge in the area of social and work-related policies.
Eurofound was established in 1975 by Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1365/75,
to contribute to the planning and design of better living and working
conditions in Europe. 
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